[ Update, January 2008: Since the Bush administration has backed away from CVID, and there are apparently no consequences for North Korea disregarding timetables in the latest agreements, refer to the “not in stone” note below; North Korea is now indeed seeking concessions. ]

The key to understating North Korea’s motivations, policy decisions, and interpreting what it seeks from its trademark brinksmanship is rooted in the cult that is the foundation of the Kim regime. That cult evolved into a state religion with the Kim family as the object of worship. The exposure of the North Korean people to reality vis-à-vis the cult is an enormous vulnerability for the regime.

A change from regime survival via extortion of concessions to regime survival by disengagement occurred after the public revelation of North Korea’s covert uranium-based nuclear program in October 2002, when the phrase “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” became a mandatory part of the U.S. negotiating lexicon concerning denuclearization.

This post will explain North Korea’s current position within this context, including why the DPRK has discontinued seeking concessions by extortion in favor of isolation and disengagement as a self-preservation strategy. [Note: updated, clarified, and expanded on 12 July 2006 in response to feedback.]

When Legitimacy and Concessions Mattered

Until October 2002 - when North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program was revealed - legitimacy was a goal nearly within the reach of North Korea. By that I mean the possibility of normalized diplomatic ties with the U.S. and Japan in particular, and during that period the DPRK did establish diplomatic ties with a handful of Western nations. Up to that time they were publicly thought to be in compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF), and the “Sunshine Policy” was in full swing after the June 2000 North-South summit between Kim Jong-il and then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. Many in the West were guardedly optimistic, while most South Koreans were what can only be described as ‘giddy.’

Between 2000 and late 2002 the DPRK took several small steps that were interpreted as an inept yet sincere North Korean attempts at reciprocating the South’s engagement overtures, including market oriented changes to food distribution and housing systems (now reversed). Additionally, they had admitted to abducting several Japanese citizens (but omitted dozens), promised to repatriate those living, and (until this week) extended the self-imposed moratorium on ICBM testing – they had their eyes on the estimated US$ 10 billion in reparations and aid from Japan.

After their illegal uranium enrichment program was revealed in October 2002, the situation quickly deteriorated.

On a side note for those that quibble about the illegality of North Korea enriching uranium per the 1994 Agreed Framework — Article III, section 2 of the 1994 Agreed Framework states, “The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The 1991 Joint Declaration states in Article 1, “The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons,” and in Article 3, “The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” The processing was clearly, if implicitly, forbidden by the agreement.

International reaction to the events of October 4, 2002, particularly that of the U.S. and Japan, forced North Korea to reassess some of its goals:

After being confronted with evidence during a meeting in P’yongyang on October 4, 2002, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Seok-Ju admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea has secretly continued a nuclear-weapons development program, in addition to possessing “more powerful things,” perhaps alluding to chemical or biological weapons. (McGeary, 2002 & Sanger, 2002 Oct. 16)

Regime Survival: From Legitimacy and Extortion to Strategic Disengagement

Before October 2002 North Korea was very close to reaping some major benefits while still maintaining hope of concealing and nurturing a nuclear weapons program. After that, however, the concept of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (i.e., North Korea) became the standard that any future agreement or deal from Washington must include. Any following U.S. administration, Democrat or Republican, would find it difficult if not impossible to abandon those terms after North Korea’s record of transgressions; words and agreements would no longer be enough:

North Korea needs to make a strategic choice — and make it clear to the world as Libya has done — that it will abandon its nuclear weapons and programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.

[. . .]

Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship and other unwelcome consequences. (emphasis added)

Agreements or deals suddenly become much less attractive to the North Korean leadership, who would have to actually choose between their nuclear programs and the concessions they craved.

By ‘concessions’ (extortion) I refer to diplomatic recognition, light-water reactors, the fuel oil supply, large blocks of developmental aid and the like, but not humanitarian aid such as the World Food Program provides or the aid from South Korea. This particularly refers to the large package deals sought by the DPRK from the U.S. and Japan, and not the relative trickle of regime sustaining aid received from China and South Korea.

Pyongyang’s signature brinksmanship negotiating style has remained very consistent, but when achieving legitimacy became impractical due to the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” conundrum, they switched gears from trying to gain more concessions to stalling negotiations and engagement.

Negotiations leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework, or to the June 2000 summit provide examples of the style of negotiation used to gain concessions – while the brinksmanship is always apparent, there was also some give along with the take, even if limited and ultimately false.

Negotiations after October 2002, the Six-Party Talks, have lacked even that miniscule amount of give seen previously, with the notable one-day exception of the joint statement reached during the fourth round of Six-Party Talks in September 2005.

The shift to disengagement was swift, if subtle at the time. In December 2002 South Korea’s presidential election was between Roh Moo Hyun, who favored continuing the basic tenants of the Sunshine Policy, and opposition candidate Lee Hoi Chang, who favored the U.S. policy of isolating an uncooperative North Korea. If North Korea were interested in continued economic support from South Korea, the obvious candidate would have been Roh – and he has not disappointed North Korea with his nearly blind appeasement.

Historically times of increased North-South tension have helped the more conservative candidates in South Korean elections. However, one week before the election North Korea announced that it was immediately reactivating a nuclear reactors that had been closed since the 1994 agreement. The timing of North Korea’s announcement was directly beneficial to the more conservative Lee Hoi Chang, who gained on Roh but was still defeated. This is completely at odds with a concession-seeking strategy.

Since then North Korea has continued to employ more than ample brinkmanship, but has not sought concessions as before. Many analysts and pundits assume North Korea is still seeking concessions and nuclear blackmail, but evidence and logic suggests otherwise. This is where it is critical to understand the cult factor on North Korean leadership behavior.

The Role of the Kim Family Cult in Regime Survival and Disengagement

Kim Jong-il is sometimes described as crazy, although he is more likely a sociopath (and may have other issues). At any rate, he is well aware of the unique vulnerability posed to his cult of personality by outside information, and has for years taken active measures to ensure the isolation of the regime, as his father did. Kim Il-sung, however, had an established, if greatly exaggerated, history of fighting the Japanese and was a charismatic leader; Kim Jong-il is none of those things and is much more at risk for it.

The goal of North Korea is regime survival, and I agree with Nicholas Eberstadt here (h/t Marmot):

Pundits often observe that Pyongyang is intent, foremost, upon regime survival. While incontestably true, this “insight” is also utterly superficial, insofar as all governments regard their own survival as a paramount priority. What distinguishes North Korea’s quest for survival are the peculiar and punitive conditions that must be satisfied in order to prolong Kim Jong Il’s rule. (emphasis added)

I will take this a level further and say that what distinguishes North Korea more precisely is the enormous vulnerability the cult foundation has to engagement with the outside world. This leads to the difference in methods of maintaining survival before and after October 2002:

Regime survival by Extortion of Concessions
vs.
Regime survival by Strategic Disengagement

The first is false engagement – agreements entered with no intention of keeping them, and engineering them so that they are easily reversible. The second is close to total self-isolation, except for allowing no-strings-attached support. For example, allowing from South Korea and China, but not allowing WFP aid with the condition of inspections to insure the food went to the neediest recipients rather than political elites or the military.

Note that true engagement of the sort that would lead to reunification or a more open society is specifically excluded in this analysis as it is a completely unrealistic option for the regime. That is a discussion for the next regime.

For those unfamiliar with the extent of ideological indoctrination in the DPRK, one of the best books describing the core years of the buildup, development, and operation the cult is “Kim Il-song’s North Korea,” by Helen Louise-Hunter. A second and far more affordable option is “The Aquariums of Pyongyang,” by Kang Chol-Hwan. Things have changed dramatically since the famine years, but that earlier history is required to get an accurate big picture view today. The art of North Korea is dominated by cult inspired themes and is a useful visual to understanding this bizarre society. Below are a few observations and quotes from both books that help explain the extent of indoctrination in North Korea.

Kim Il Sung made thousands of trips around his country, giving “on-the-spot guidance” at worksites ranging from farms, to construction, to factory processes. Kim’s visits to these locations are marked by plaques, markers, and even glass cases; if he entered a room, a plaque is placed over the door, and the location is considered to be a sacred spot. (Hunter, 1999: 14-15)

The birthplaces of Kim Il Sung, his parents, and his son, Kim Jong Il are now shrines to which thousands of patrons and schoolchildren visit each year. All government offices and most homes sport portraits of Kim Il Sung, the “Great Leader,” or Kim Jong Il, the “Dear Leader,” or both, and all citizens are required to wear lapel pins with the likeness of either the “Great” or “Dear” leader. (Hunter, 1999: 16-17)

Education in the form of communist indoctrination and the study of Kim Il Sung is the primary method of social control:

In reading, students read about Kim’s guerrilla exploits; in math, the learn to count by counting the number of American soldiers killed or the number of tanks destroyed in the Korea War; in history, they study the Communist revolution in Korea; in music, they sing Kim’s marching songs; and in drama, the reenact his life story. The emphasis on the political never diminishes. (Hunter, 1999: 214)

Although educational statistics for North Korea look impressive relative to other third-world nations, the actual value of their education is reduced by the enormous volume of time spent on the study of things Kim Il Sung, with estimates being between 30 and 40 percent of all class time. For example, “the average North Korean… knows little history except Korean history and the history of Marxism-Leninism,” and “is not even exposed to traditional Korean literature; he is likely to have read nothing but Communist revolutionary literature written since 1948.” (Hunter, 1999: 217)

Perhaps most telling of all is that the “first words many [children] learn [are] ‘Comrade Kim.’” They are taught that Kim is the source of everything good and that they should love, honor, an obey him” (Hunter, 1999: 46)

All progress in North Korea is attributed to Kim Il Sung personally; all setbacks to collaborators or traitors, South Korea, the U.S. “imperialists,” acts of nature, etc. Indeed, both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are considered to have almost supernatural powers. Everything is explained in the context of Kim Il Sung, from history, to political thought, to how the world works. Most North Koreans are unaware of Kim’s time in the Russian army, or that the Chinese fought in the Korean War, and they believe that Kim is internationally famous as one of the world’s greatest leaders. (Hunter, 1999: 21-22)

Kang Chol-Hwan, who from age 9 to 19 was interned in one of the many documented concentration camps or “gulags” in North Korea for political prisoners, noted that the only heated room the prisoners could normally enter during the winter was a special room for the study of Kim Il Sung’s political thought. (Kang, 2001: 134-135) The prisoners and citizens alike were required to wear their best clothing and be reverent in such rooms, leading to the obvious comparison to a church sanctuary or temple, and the ceremony and worship that occurs in such places.

Kang was dumbfounded when he saw that South Korea is actually a successful nation. He had firmly believed that the South was a land where hungry workers rioted in the streets and fought for scraps of food, and that North Korea was a socialist paradise, even if he had been judged to be politically unfit. The truth that South Korea is actually a technologically advanced nation with successful multi-national firms, and the North more of a socialist hell, tore at his years of indoctrination. (Kang, 2001: 205) The fact that other defectors have a similar reaction is very significant, and:

Not surprisingly, therefore, the entire society must be kept in virtual isolation, because if isolation cannot be maintained all these myths are likely to be challenged and undermined, with consequent severe damage to the belief system supporting the regime. (Bradner, 2000)

Regime survival has remains the primary goal, as with any regime, but survival by legitimacy (diplomatic recognition and the aid it would bring) or extortion of concessions became an untenable method for the regime once the conditions for any agreement – invasive inspections and irreversible nuclear disarmament – were made clear. Additionally, in North Korea’s case the ‘regime’ is willing to see at least millions of its population die before it will capitulate.

Why the Theory of Extortion is Deceptively Attractive

Extortion of concessions via brinksmanship is one of North Korea’s best known negotiating tactics. The package deal North Korea received as a part of the 1994 Agreed Framework was extortion on a massive scale. When the DPRK engages in similar antics now it is most usually automatically assumed that they are again seeking to extort more concessions, or strengthen their position to do so. The recent missile launches are a case in point.

The tactic of extortion is dated for a few reasons. The phrase, “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” implies that inspections would be invasive, and as North Korea’s dealings with the Word Food Program show, they will reject anything that requires such levels of foreign contact with North Koreans (ideological contamination). The reason is clear:

North Korea’s preference for South Korean and Chinese food aid is so transparent that there should not be a debate about this; South Korea inspected to see where the food went 20 times last year, while the WFP inspects 300-500 times per year (per a WFP official interviewed on NPR Radio, 29 September 2005). Those statistics are the number one clue. The next one is the ‘military first policy.’ North Korea has consistently tried to funnel food aid to the military and the regime elite (e.g., U.S. food aid found in a captured NK sub during the last food crisis). This is not complicated.

It is not about keeping spies out (though of course that must account for some of it), it is about keeping INFORMATION out. Information is the bane of a cult society that has an entire alternate – and completely fictional – history that was created with the express purpose to deify the ‘Great Leader,’ the ‘Dear Leader,’ and now ‘the Commander,’ (if we can trust the report that Jong-chol has been selected and is called by that moniker). The regime sees the starvation as collateral damage, that’s about it.

Even the workers at Keumgangsan are ethnic Korean Chinese. Outside information threatens the fundamentals of the cult mythology upon which the Kim family has build its power, which is why the country maintains its place as the most self-isolated nation on earth. The “military first” policy is specifically meant to maintain isolation from the inside. Again, I agree with Eberstadt on this point:

In Pyongyang’s telling, “ideological and cultural infiltration”–economic and other contacts with the outside world–brought down Soviet socialism; the masters of Pyongyang have no intention of allowing this bourgeois infection to undo their own gulag paradise.

More simply put, this level of invasive engagement is deemed as unacceptable to the regime for fear information exchange and the weakening of the cult.

The main point to get from this section is this; extortion was actively pursued by North Korea when they thought they could obtain concessions while maintaining both isolation and additional covert nuclear programs. Lesson learned by those who would give said concessions, primarily the U.S. and Japan, from the disintegration of the 1994 Agreed Framework have precluded such an easy deal in the future.

If North Korea is engaging in brinkmanship to extort concessions, they must have a reasonable expectation that another government is going to respond and make said concessions available. But at this point in time, and for the foreseeable future, either the U.S. or Japan giving in to this type of extortion without “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” denuclearization is exceedingly unlikely. Provocations have not and are not likely to be translated into benefits to North Korea as key players will not reward that behaviour anymore.

Looking back to past failed agreements, the obvious flaw was that they were not easily verifiable and were easily reversible by North Korea. No U.S. administration will make that mistake with North Korea.

If, as some believe, that North Korea is waiting for a Democratic president to deal with, I think they will be sorely disappointed. Even if that president wanted to make a less than “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” deal, they would have to consider the potentially devastating political consequence if North Korea once again reneged. Already viewed as weak on defense, another 1994 Agreed Framework-like failure could cost the Democrats long-term considering American sentiment on this issue.

The above is why I disagree with Eberstadt here:

Plainly put, North Korea’s survival strategy is a policy of international military extortion.

[…]

Improbable as it may sound, Pyongyang has now come to engage South Korea and the great powers of the Pacific (China, Japan, Russia and the U.S.) in “denuclearization” talks from a position of tactical advantage.

The first part was accurate up until late 2002, but no longer is. The regime would be forced to give up key weapons systems in any realistic agreement – and word of that would also spread internally, just like the vicious imperialist ideas of the foreigners. It might even be more damning.

This is North Korea’s strategic disengagement. This is why talks – be they bi-tri-multi-lateral – will continue to fail, and why North Korea will continue to pursue nuclear weapons as additional insurance of regime survival.

The texts of most political science and international relations books do not take into account the unique features and limitations of North Korea’s cult regime. Many will continue to believe that diplomacy can solve this problem – ‘if only we had a better policy towards the DPRK, if only we engaged them.’ Adjusting U.S. policy to influence North Korea is doomed to failure since North Korea cannot meet the base conditions of any realistic agreement.

When an analyst or pundit explains North Korea’s actions as a bid to blackmail concessions from the international community you must ask yourself; a) is North Korea willing to allow the invasive inspections and verified nuclear disarmament that would be required, and b) is North Korea willing to allow such exposure to a population that is has kept nearly hermetically sealed for decades? The only realistic answer is no to both, which is why the nuclear blackmail theory is not longer valid.

What Strategic Engagement Is Not

Mostly it is not set in stone. There are a few caveats for this theory.

The first and most important is while Kim Jong-il is in power. Once Kim dies – the likeliest way he will leave power – it’s anyone’s guess as to who will take the reigns and if they will be able to avoid collapse. But it brings the opportunity for someone else to negotiate with, perhaps not someone with the cult issue over their head.

The second is unless China agrees to threaten the DPRK into engagement. China could, for example, threaten to cut off oil and other trade with North Korea, which would cause a relatively speedy collapse for the nation. However, unless the U.S. puts incredible pressure on China to do this, perhaps by threatening trade restrictions of its own, China will not do this to North Korea. China enjoys it’s buffer zones – Tibet, North Korea, Mongolia, Eastern Turkistan, and Burma – and won’t likely kill North Korea only to end up with USFK on the Yalu. China also enjoys the continuing wedge between the U.S. and South Korea, which can only increase China’s leadership in the region at America’s expense.

Third, there is the unlikely but not unthinkable possibility that North Korea may come to believe that they could obtain a package deal like and under the same easy terms as the 1994 Agreed Framework, but without the verifiable and irreversible conditions attached. And it would more than willingly participate in insincere engagement, using the same tactics used 1991-1994, to try to achieve that goal. But there would have to be a major and rather unlikely shift in Washington for that to be possible. Also, the regime currently is getting a pretty good deal from South Korea and China while retaining nuclear programs.

Finally, when speaking concessions to be extorted, it does not speak of the trade and other aid from South Korea, which while life-sustaining to a North Korea in would-licking mode, is relatively insignificant to the light-water reactors, diplomatic recognition, and more than US$10 billion in aid and loans expected from Japan for colonial repartitions. More simply, the easy money and trade from South Korea or China is not included. This goes hand-in-hand with number three above – no aid with invasive conditions attached. Unmonitored aid or deals that will allow the regime to route food and other resources to the elite and military will always be welcomed by North Korea.

Conclusions

I suggest you test this theory by applying it to North Korea’s actions as they occur. Ask yourself if the actions have a realistic chance of extracting concessions, or increasing isolation. Leave a comment and we can discuss the outcome.

At this point there are no attractive options for dealing with North Korea. While I believe that negotiations, including the Six-Party Talks, are useless for reaching any sort of viable agreement and achieving engagement, they may be useful for after the regime falls in that regular contacts are in place and familiar with each other, however that may be. For that is the timeframe they are likely to continue.

If the cult element were removed from this equation, the story would be different, there would be no barrier to engagement, no need for a strategy of disengagement and isolation. But then history would also be very different.

It is ironic that the tool used by the Kim family to achieve unimaginable power and actual God-like status in their own country has now relegated the regime to a slow and shameful death. The painful part of that death has been reserved for the North Korean people, who have and are paying the highest price of all.

---

This post should be read in conjunction with:
Analysis: Why North Korea Launched an ICBM
North Korea’s TD-2 Launch was s Tactical Snake Eyes
Excuse Me, Excuse Me, What’s My Motivation?
On ‘Strategic Disengagement’

---

Blogs on reactions (and reactions to reactions) on the launch, in no particular order:

NK Zone: Why Have They Launched?
BigHominid’s Hairy Chasms: A Diplomacy Game
Lost Nomad: When Will China Pull the Plug on North Korea?
North Korean Economy Watch: Summary of current and proposed trade sanctions on DPRK
China Confidential: Hill Spins China’s Non-Moderation of North Korea
Marmot’s Hole: I think I’m going to be sick (updated)
Oranckay: NK just lost its own game of strip poker
Occidentalism: 7 Missiles… and Counting?
Asian Security Monitor: ‘Hyperpuissance,’ a Myth in N. Korea
It Makes a Difference to the Sheep: North Korean Missile Launches…Why?
Sperwes Log: The Self-Described “Little Turd” Targeted Hawaii?
The Intelligence Summit: North Korea: Missile Tests and Regional Impacts
—–

Note: This post was imported from The Korea Liberator, and all comments did not make the transition.