North Korea’s TD-2 Launch was a Tactical Snake Eyes
by Richardson ~ July 5th, 2006. Filed under: Axis of Evil, DPRK Military, Diplomacy, Six-Party Talks.
Provocations such as the launches are tactics in North Korea’s strategy of disengagement, and aside from the obvious technical failure, the Taepodong 2 launch was a tactical disaster for North Korea for a few additional reasons.
First and foremost the risk of dramatic failure was unnecessary as North Korea did not need to launch an ICBM, or any missiles for that matter, to continue avoiding Six-Party Talks and other forms of engagement (note: if you don’t agree with my ‘why they launched,’ then this reason will not resonate with you). Pyongyang could have continued using any number of other handy reasons – existing sanctions, any military exercises, U.S. reconnaissance flights, etc. – to flimsily justify their continued disengagement.
Much more mileage could literally have been gotten out of the ill-fated TD-2 by not launching and continuing the guessing game, which would have accomplished the same goal (no return to talks), but without the repercussions, some of which are likely to sting (remittances from Japan, if Japan follows through on that threat).
A close second is that North Korea gave away information to U.S. intelligence, and presumably others, who obviously had the region under close surveillance, be it satellite or flights; cover of darkness is not cover. Although the 35-40 second flight was not much, even with the relatively short flight time, the U.S. no doubt gleaned some very useful data on the missile.
This leads to the third reason the launch was debacle; North Korea likely gained almost no useful data for research and development. In fact is it likely that the U.S. actually was able to collect more data than North Korea! For a nation hell bent on developing a nuclear deterrent, a delivery system is essential. Heads may literally roll for this failure.
Last and least the obvious; the launch is a huge embarrassment to the regime, and makes them look even more foolish for making threats they have no hope of delivering on. For a nation that earns hard currency by selling missiles, it’s also not the best advertising they could hope for. Yes, the SRBM and MRBM launches were successful, but the failure puts a potential taint on the quality of all North Korea missiles, not that they were considered anything above Saturday night specials to begin with.
North Korea would have been much better off not launching at all. In fact, North Korea could have suggested another round of Six-Party talks while continuing SRMB antics, knowing that the U.S. would decline under those circumstances; North Korea could have feigned being in the right while actually shooting down the talks. But they blew it.
A successful TD-2 launch would have removed the last reason (embarrassment and bad advertising), but improved U.S. intelligence collection on the missile, and possibly would have helped move South Korea move from appeasement to something more logical.
What the launch was not about and will not help with is extracting more concessions and resources from the U.S. et al in future negotiations. That was not the North Korean goal, and would not accomplish that end at any rate, at least with any Republican U.S. administration.
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July 6th, 2006 at 9:26 am
I think the desciption of disengagment is right on the money, but I disagree that the launch and spectacle was not about getting more concessions.
The North wants discussions - but only on its terms. We can also say this is a push to get only the type of engagement it wants.
The highest ranking defector that came in 1998 said Pyongyang very much wanted to deal with the US — but by which he meant deal with American absolutely on terms dictated by the North.
In the current case, NK wants 1-on-1 talks only — and it wants to limit what is to be discussed - and all it wants discussed is what the US is going to give NK, the end of recent US santions, and at maximum one or two cosmetic items like mothballing spent fuel rods or a PROMISE not to fire missiles.
NK practiced a restictive form of engagement with the Soviet Union and China.
NK very much wants to be the most isolated nation in the world - and missile launches help make that more of a reality but it also wants certain nations to give it material supplies it badly needs at minimum to survive - and it wants the richest and most influencial nation on earth to lead the way in getting them - the US.
July 6th, 2006 at 5:06 pm
Concessions were a North Korean target, until Oct 2002 when “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” attached the price of actual cooperation to them, then concessions became less attractive (aside from the kind the get from the ROK - the free kind).
Hwang Jang Yop defected before this shift occurred.
The DPRK asks for/demands direct talks b/c they know the U.S. is committed to the multi-lateral approach and will refuse.
July 6th, 2006 at 6:55 pm
North Korea’s TD-2 Launch was a Tactical Snake Eyes
[…] On balance, reality may be more farcical than parody. The real Kim Jong Il doesn’t deny having WMD’s. He demonstrates them (if ineptly). But his mockery of the U.N. lacks no trappings of contempt but a trap door … over a shark tank. The following quote is not from “Team America:” “Our military will continue with missile launch drills in the future as part of efforts to strengthen self-defense deterrent,” said the statement, carried in state-run media. […]
COMMENT:
AUTHOR: usinkorea
EMAIL: usinkorea@hotmail.com
I think NK is still banking on concessions for virtually nothing again.
I believe it believes it has the greater will and lasting power than the “weak” democracy of the US where all he needs to do is rattle a few cages to get important members of government and the media to turn into Kim Jong Il advocates by saying the US needs to “do something” by which they actually end up meaning - do enough of what NK wants to make things “seem” nice — like make some promises.
I don’t think NK has been counting on major concessions from the US — that it had to achieve that goal.
I think it is been guaging its provocations on how far it can push things before China and SK start to waver in their support.
One thing this ICBM test has done —
—it has shown that both those nations will stand behind it even in the face of a major outcry. And throw in Russia too.
Now, I think NK will feel it can push a little further.
I would not really be suprised to see a nuke test within the next 2 years.
I’d give it a 30% right now….
COMMENT:
AUTHOR: usinkorea
EMAIL: usinkorea@hotmail.com
I wasn’t clear on my point.
I think NK beleives it can get enough out of SK and China to survive and whatever it can twist out of the US is extra.
So provocations are perhaps considered by them as a win-win proposition.
They do worry about the limits.
I think that is why they haven’t shot an ICBM up before now.
But, they are testing the limits, and they learned this weak they can push harder than they perhaps thought before now that they have seen Russia, China, and SK line up behind them.