Analysis: Why North Korea Launched an ICBM

by Richardson ~ July 4th, 2006. Filed under: Axis of Evil, DPRK Military, Diplomacy, Engagement, Geopolitics, Six-Party Talks.

Update: Yesterday I said China, and probably Russia, would opt for a slap on the wrist for North Korea (see below). Today they do just that:

China and Russia resisted an attempt in the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions against North Korea for its missile launches Wednesday, saying only diplomacy could halt the isolated regime’s nuclear and rocket development programs. (emphasis added)

Original Post: North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong 2 ICBM and up to five SRBM (a Yonhap report says ten total missiles) is meant to cause the U.S. and Japan, and possibly others, to impose sanctions and take other negative diplomatic actions, which North Korea will use as a justification for continuing to avoid Six-Party Talks. This is a tactical move in its ongoing ‘strategic disengagement,’ which North Korea has been using since its uranium enrichment program was uncovered in October 2002.

While this may seem illogical at first, it is not for several reasons. First, after the U.S. attack on North Korea’s illegal international money laundering and counterfeiting - on top of existing sanctions - there is not a great deal more the U.S. can do in that area, although Japan can do somewhat more with remittances from Koreans in Japan. Second, North Korea knows that China and South Korea will not let it collapse, and will continue to provide food and energy aid. Third, the dangers of engagement are greater for the DPRK than the dangers of isolation, especially considering the RPK/PRC safety net reduces the effects of international efforts to isolate the country. This last point will be expounded on in a future post on ‘strategic disengagement,’ probably sooner than later.

Reactions from Six-Party Nations

U.S. and Japanese responses to a North Korean ICBM launch were made clear over the past week, so there should be no surprise if and when additional sanctions are enacted and aid is reduced. North Korea’s response is easy to imagine.

At this writing China has not released an official statement, but I expect them to say something to the effect that it was regretful that North Korea launched the missiles, and that that China supports a peaceful resolution through diplomatic means. Basically no repercussions for North Korea from China are expected.

South Korea has issued the standard “deeply regrets” statements. One test of how “deeply” the ROK government actually regrets North Korea’s launch will be if their plans to ease restrictions on economic remittances to North Korea is reversed. Perhaps unlikely, since the announce to ease restrictions was made during the build up to the launch.

Also no official statement fro Russia as of yet, but something similar to China’s expected response would not be surprising.

Other Analysis

Clinton-era National Security Advisor Sandy Berger on CNN noted that the U.S., Japan, and others likely will respond to the launch by imposing (and re-imposing eased) sanctions. A the same time he noted that the primary issue that needs attention is the Six-Party Talks and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, but failed to see the rather glaring result; that sanctions would make further Six-Party Talks impossible if enacted.

Jim Walsh, an international security “expert” speaking on CNN, said that the launch is North Korea’s way of signaling that it wants to make a deal with the U.S. Whatever Mr. Walsh is an expert of, it does not include North Korea, which for years has declared variations of, “sanctions equal war.” If the DPRK truly wanted a deal it would only need to a) not launch the missiles, b) return to the Six-Party Talks, and c) reap the benefits. But any deal with the U.S. would require, as a minimum, complete and verifiable denuclearization, something North Korea is unwilling to do. As any agreements, or ‘deal’, with North Korea will include the element of complete verification, it is highly unlikely that the launch was meant to gain bigger and better prizes.

Gordon Chang, an actual North Korea expert, also on CNN, gave much more analytically sound commentary, saying the launch was an act of defiance against the U.S. in that not only did they launch, it was a multiple launch on America’s Independence Day. He also said that if China did not want the launch to occur, it would not have. Unlike other analysts I saw on CNN or Fox News today, Mr. Chang noted the other reason North Korea had for launching; simply testing the missile(s), although that was clearly a distant secondary reason.

Oops & More Analysis

At this point I have to say that I was wrong – I inaccurately predicted that North Korea would not launch for several good reasons (apparently Kim Jong-il does not read this blog). But this leads to tomorrows analysis of this event, which will focus on why the ICBM launch is a tactical failure and huge mistake for North Korea, the main points being that a) a launch was not needed to manufacture an excuse to continue avoiding talks, b) the failed launch was a national embarrassment, c) North Korea gleaned (probably) little useful data for missile R&D, and d) they gave U.S. intelligence data on all missiles launched.

7 Responses to Analysis: Why North Korea Launched an ICBM

  1. Duke

    Ah, do I sense real desperation here?

    All along many including myself thought another case of brinkmanship but audacity to celebrate July 4th with TD-2 and junior Scuds and Nodongs in unison?

    Sounds like the DPRK military boys won the argument for launching but could this mean that Kim is losing grip and had to placate boys with the guns? Knowing the effect of international condemnations and boycotts not to mention MAJOR embarassmeent to PRC chief Hu? Regime survival anyone?

    Yep let’s strangle more as recent US strangle with moeny laundering and punishing Banko Delta in Macau is having desired effect.

    Check out this article from Stratfor - best intelligence and may be even better than CIA. Too bad subscription is expensive but link below is free.

    http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=266903

  2. Duke

    1st paragraph and last 2 paragraphs from Strafor makes much sense including implication of FAILED LAUNCH:

    North Korea: Missile-Launch Rumors and Regime Preservation
    May 30, 2006 19 35 GMT

    Summary

    As the six-party North Korean nuclear talks remain stalled, rumors of an imminent North Korean missile launch are circulating. Such reports are not unusual, and Pyongyang is certainly continuing with the development of new missile and rocket systems. But the regime’s survival is predicated on maintaining a sense of ambiguity about the true threat level — something that will determine whether the launch occurs.

    In Pyongyang, regime survival drives the decision-making process. Decisions about economic talks with South Korea, nuclear talks with the United States or new missile launches will always be carried out with this goal in mind. Though the methods of regime preservation might not make complete sense abroad, they are clearly rational from the North Korean perspective, and thus predictable.

    For Pyongyang, then, any new test will be carefully examined before being carried out. Any new launch will be of a satellite-launch vehicle configuration, as with the Taepodong-1 launch, to provide just enough questions of intent and capability to avoid tipping the strategic calculus. A failed satellite launch would prove more devastating to North Korea’s carefully cultivated image than no launch at all. Unless the risks change, or the regime feels an attack is imminent, the current calculus in Pyongyang still weighs against a new Taepodong launch.

  3. James J. Na

    I personally thought that Norks would launch… and I wanted them to do so.

    I got my wish. Now, will the Bush administration show the cojones and make something of this gift and finally present the value proposition question to Beijing?

  4. Joseph Steinberg

    There is the possibility that the missile launched was not a TD-2, but a faulty version of an earlier model. As some others have mentioned, the number of sites used and the variety missile types is interesting. That might have been the intent all along. Until we know what exactly left the platform and how it landed where it did, all else is speculative.

  5. Richardson

    TD-1 or TD-2, the result is the same, which is what NK wants; the excuse not to come to Six-Party Talks. How it landed, etc., simply does not matter to that end.

  6. The Korea Liberator » North Korea’s TD-2 Launch was a Tactical Snake Eyes

    Analysis: Why North Korea Launched an ICBM

    […] First and foremost the risk of dramatic failure was unnecessary as North Korea did not need to launch an ICBM, or any missiles for that matter, to continue avoiding Six-Party Talks and other forms of engagement (note: if you don’t agree with my ‘why they launched,’ then this reason will not resonate with you). Pyongyang could have continued using any number of other handy reasons – existing sanctions, any military exercises, U.S. reconnaissance flights, etc. – to flimsily justify their continued disengagement. […]

  7. DPRK Studies » North Korea’s TD-2 Launch was a Tactical Snake Eyes

    Analysis: Why North Korea Launched an ICBM

    […] First and foremost the risk of dramatic failure was unnecessary as North Korea did not need to launch an ICBM, or any missiles for that matter, to continue avoiding Six-Party Talks and other forms of engagement (note: if you don’t agree with my ‘why they launched,’ then this reason will not resonate with you). Pyongyang could have continued using any number of other handy reasons – existing sanctions, any military exercises, U.S. reconnaissance flights, etc. – to flimsily justify their continued disengagement. […]

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