Book Review: Offspring of Empire
by Richardson ~ June 26th, 2006. Filed under: Book Reviews, Economics, Korean Culture.Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Origins of Korean Capitalism 1876-1945. Carter J. Eckert. University of Washington Press, 1991, revised 1997.
Offspring of Empire uses the Koch’ang Kim family as representative example in order to make the point that modern Korean capitalism had its origins in the colonial era, rather that the pre-colonial Chosun Dynasty.
Many Koreans would rather believe that the “original impetus for capitalist growth came from within Korea itself,” and Korean scholars “have focused … on the increasing commercialization of seventeenth and eighteenth century Yi society…” (2) Eckert argues that capitalism in Korea (a.k.a. “sprouts”) was not significant and had only a very small chance of ever developing independently an industrial base, which is a necessary component of capitalism. (3-4) “The Japanese in Korea were actually both agents of socioeconomic change and oppressors at one and the same time, and it is therefore quite reasonable to talk of economic modernization within the context of imperialism.”
“Indeed, it is questionable whether the Korean bourgeoisie may be justly considered a victim of Japanese aggression at all – at least in an economic sense.” (6) That statement could be considered fighting words in Korea, but Eckert’s careful documentation and analysis justifies his claim.
The demonstrations on March 1st came as a complete shock to the Japanese, who mistook the angry silence of the Koreans as complacency. The depth of the problem was realized when the Japanese saw that people from all levels of society – from rich to poor – participated in the riots and where disaffected with the Japanese. (45) Thus a new colonial government was created with Admiral Saito Makoto as the Government-General and many changes were made in order to placate the Koreans, including recruitment into the bureaucracy, and allowed to own and operate more business, including newspapers, etc. “The strategy finally adopted by the Saito regime toward the nationalist phenomenon was the time-honored one of ‘divide and conquer,’” [emphasis added] Japan had seen bitter class struggle in the wake of industrialization. “They reasoned quite logically that the same phenomenon would also occur in Korea as economic development proceeded.” “The class divisions in Korean society could develop to Japans benefit only if Korean bourgeoisies was somehow brought into the development process as a kind of junior partner. Such class-based cooperation between Japanese and Korean would… secure native assistance in constructing an economy in line with Japanese imperial goals.. and more important, it would promote class differentiation and conflict in Korean society [emphasis added] and thereby destroy the frightening unity of the nationalist movement.” This policy was put into place within a few months after Saito took office. (47-48)
The rest of the book addresses the points concerning Korean dependency upon Japan, the willing collaboration between Korean businessmen and Japan, and the thorough way in which the Japanese “divide and conquer” strategy was implement – all with exhaustive examples.
The idea that Kyongbang and the Koch’ang Kims were a completely Korean (i.e., nationalist) operation is absurd – they were in it for the material gains. This was demonstrated – by their conduct as landlords, treatment of Korean factory workers, and overly submissive posture – time and again.
The Japanese “divide and conquer” policy was very insightful and efficient. We might call it “diabolical,” but if the Japanese had not been defeated, it might be looked on in a much more positive light. And the Korean’s may have been relegated to a status similar to that of non-Han populations in China.
The nationalist Korean position is something of a logical fallacy in that the two unrelated points (colonial oppression and industrialism) are conjoined into a single proposition, or in other words, that Japanese colonial oppression was evil and did not benefit Koreans, thus the industrial structure perpetuated by them was also evil and did not benefit Koreans. Evidence contrary to that position must be excluded to perpetuate such a view. Both the structure (banking systems, government-business collusion, etc.) and the personnel (Japan educated business men, or those using the Japanese model) represent the continuing Japanese influence on the development of Korean industrialism and capitalist style, until present.
One reader’s review at Amazon.com commented that, “What remains is the disturbing
thought, that the glue holding nationalism together on the Korean peninsula, is morally bankrupt… Eckert’s argument undermines the Korean argument, that Koreans were developing into a modern nation just like any western nation. He also undermines the role of Koreans in the capitalist development of their own country.” [I disagree with the last sentence.]
Overall this is a good book with a solid presentation of the subject matter. Not at the top of my must-read list for Korea, but required if you’re interested in the Colonial Period.
Note: This review had been on the backburner for some time. I was prompted finish it by this post at Occidentalism.
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June 26th, 2006 at 7:28 pm
I applaud Eckert for providing the facts which often get put under rug in attempts to rewrite the history.
All this hatred for those who “conspired” with Japanese colonials by lefist PIG Uri commies are good example of marxist minded and under privilege loath over the “haves” and “well to do” including much of upper well to do middle class of ROK.
Sure the fact is those who were in cahoots with Japanese came out ahead economically (founders of Hyundai and Samsung), politcally (since many studied and served under Japanese) and military (Prez Park and initial ROK army were comprised of ex-Japanese officers and NCOs), and eduction system.
Impact by Japanese occupation was POSITIVE in many fronts and brought about positive changes to the society and helped ROK become where it is today since the leader of 50’s to 70’s were educated in Japan and imitated Japanese way of doing business.
Having said that Korean suffered under brutal rule. What is unfortunate is that Korean “victimization” like Chinese reliving the past in hopes of whipping up false sense of nationalism and discount the positive aspects.
My father’s side come from the “privileged” and pro-Japanses side and mother lived in Japan when she was young. Though it’s easy to be judgemental towards those who tolerated Japanese oppressions, one needs to be realistic as how one would have behaved at that time and age.
June 26th, 2006 at 9:51 pm
There is obviously much scholarship yet to be written, but I found Eckert’s “Offspring of Empire” essential to understanding modern Korea’s economical development. Most useful was his detailing how the Korean textile industry developed to target those Asian niche markets that were not being serviced by Japanese textile firms. Thus Korean capitalism was nurtured to be mutually beneficial, yet non-competitive with Japanese firms. Likewise, it followed Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China, thereby making no small numbers of Koreans willing partners in the Japanese colonial regime. All in all, an important book. I get the impression that it is more widely discussed than read.
June 26th, 2006 at 11:38 pm
Ah, this will inspire me to read my own copy of the Eckert book as well.
As an aside, how’s the progress in terms of Eckert’s widely-anticipated biography on Park Chung Hee? Anyone?
June 27th, 2006 at 10:35 pm
The Japanese occupation legacy is a very complicated thing to assess. I think even the “good for economy, but brutal otherwise” is too simple an explanation.
I suppose to the extent that the Japanese implanted the seed of modernity in finance, banking, industrialization and so on, it was positive. But they also left a legacy of corruption and crony capitalism, which has been very difficult to extirpate.
Then there is the Japanese motive. They didn’t build a modern Korean economy out of the goodness of their hearts. They built it to be a subjugated, useful part of the Japanese imperial economic system. To the extent they trained Korean cadres, they did so to have them serve as second-class middlemen at best.
In assessing the economic impact of the Japanese occupation, one must not necessarily look at how Korea turned out after the Korean War and the subsquent massive US aid in rebuilding, but how Korea MIGHT have turned out to be had Japan won the war and successfully and permanently integrated Korea into the Japanese empire. In that regard, I do not think the assessment would be as positive.
There are also issues beyond economics (after all, we aren’t Marxists here). The Japanese occupation was a cultural and social catastrophe for Korea. Not only was there physical brutality, but there were subsantial efforts to suppress and extinguish independent and distinct Korean culture. Again, these efforts seem relatively benign only because Japan lost the war.
But here, paradoxically, I think the occupation did more to crystalize Korean nationalism and to move Koreans beyond the Chinese client-state mentality than just about anything else.
As I said, it is too complicated to render a simple verdict on the Japanese occupation. But in my view, they were certainly not gentlemen-oppressors that, say, the British were in many of their colonies.
(By that, I mean the British set up certain boudaries, or rules, for their own imperial conduct, set limits for themselves, rather than simply being guided by the exigencies of extracting resources and “use” out of their colonies.)
I am of the opinion that the American influence (including missionary influence) on modern Korea, including Korean capitalism, which accelerated in the aftermath of the Korean War is highly underrated, but in actuality a rather potent force.
June 28th, 2006 at 12:07 am
James,
Well guess who had the knowledge, backgrounds, business savvy during and after Korean War to rebuild Korea? Yep those “traitors” in cahoots and trained by Japanese. You see these people were the pilars of Korean society when Japanese were driven out. It was real disruption and void right after the end of war. They also spoke better even if lousy English since many attended prestigious universtites in Japan. Same goes for ROK armed forces till early 1970’s - Japanese trained officers. Korean businesses modeled themselves after the “keiretsu” which is “chaebol”. Japanese business men invested in Korea in the mid 60s to mid 80s and Samsung/Hyundai/Daewoo engineers looked to their Japanese counterparts with awe and envy, and model. Sure this also created Korean women whoring themselves to Japanese business man. Now young women are whoring themselves to even low class white trash in their quest to learn English. I digress.
American influence was really pumping the money in the form of aids. Those who benefited were those who already had business background and educated. Not the “Independent Army” men who mostly stayed north and led the 6/25 invasion. Strange irony indeed.
As for US missionaries, they implanted Christianity, education, charity and heathcare. All important but not related to business. For example, only few chaebol families are Christians.
If Koreans really think they remade economic miracle out of “Koreaness” then this is certainly nationalism went astray considering Yangban class looked down at commercial merchants for hundreds of years in Chosun era.
June 28th, 2006 at 1:14 am
James, Very good points. I think that Eckert lays out a fairly complete view of exactly what the Japanese expected to gain by building up the Korean economy. Certainly the government wanted to give (post-Samil) Koreans a stake in the Japanese empire, but at the same time individual Japanese companies were quite helpful in assisting their Korean counterparts precisely because the latter were expanding into niche (textile) markets that Japanese industry chose not to address, and there was business aplenty in the wake of WWI, when textile shortages spurred Asian textile industries to expand. Anyway, that’s what I remember from Eckert. He left me with the impression that the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was more than mere rhetoric, and tat among those who wanted to make it a reality (with, of course, Japan at the top) were many Japanese industrialists.
June 28th, 2006 at 2:15 am
Actually, Chaebol is modeled after Zaibatsu, not Keiretsu. And this is a classic example of the Japanese legacy. What became obsolete in Japan (well, banned by the U.S. occupation authorities) lingered on in Korea.
I would argue Protestant ethics (Weber!) and the attendant quest for education, implanted by largely American missionaries, educators, soldiers and others, played a very strong role in the development of the post-Korean War economic miracle.
Chaebol did not build the economic miracle. Without a hard-working, driven, educated professionals and workers, Chaebol would have been what the large family-run businesses are in places like Indonesia — centers of personal wealth, but not transformers of the national economy as a whole.
I am, by no means, diminishing the role of Japanese-educated officer corps and merchants. Many of them played a critical part in the post-Korean War economic miracle. But their contribution was perhaps necessary, but NOT SUFFICIENT condition for the explosive economic growth in the ’60s and on.
Furthermore, the American aid was not merely economic. The U.S. provided much needed educational and technical access that Korea lacked in the post-war period. It also constantly pushed for stronger popular representation and for the rule of law, all necessary components of true capitalism (I am, of course, not suggesting that Korean rule of law is superlative, merely that it would have been far worse without American guidance).
We often confuse these factors as being Japanese also, but the actuality is that these were missing in the pre-war Japan, and only developed (also) under U.S. occupation in the post-war period (indeed, the rise of Japan, Inc. in the post-war also owes a great debt to the U.S.).
I don’t have much use for Korean nationalism, but the people who built the Korean economic miracle — in the end — were Koreans themselves, to whom the credit is due. Both Japan and the U.S. occupied and invested resources in many other nations in the past. They did not all turn out to be economic miracles.
If Japan were to be the top dog, it wasn’t much of a CO-prosperity sphere was it?