Michael Fumento of Hudson Institute (which inhabits the same building as Discovery Institute’s D.C. office) forwarded me the link to his latest war reporting from Iraq, a multimedia piece that he considers his best. The article has many photographs and video clips, and documents the heroic efforts of our troops in Ramadi, a city to which many of the jihadists fled when Falluja was cleared out.

Some choice parts:

The Iraq war is covered mostly by reporters who hole up in Baghdad hotels and send out Iraqi stringers to collect what the reporters deem news, as an article in the April 6, 2006, New York Review of Books described in great detail. The reporters convert these accounts into prose and put them on the wire. Except for that all-powerful “Baghdad” dateline, they might just as well be writing from Podunk. [snip]

Although firefights and other hostile action are routine, IEDs are the worst problem, he said. They were responsible for five of the six deaths his men have suffered since deploying in January. As of mid-May, the troops at Corregidor had suffered 380 attacks from IEDs while finding and destroying 667 more. Five deaths (and additional injuries) are tragic, but these numbers do counter the misimpression that “ingenious” insurgents are expert in making and laying bombs. In fact, they must expend a massive amount of effort and materiel to do any harm to coalition forces. [snip]

An added “attraction” is the snipers who occasionally pop off a round into the camp from the minarets. They know of Americans’ unwillingness to attack “religious” buildings, even when they’re clearly being used for military activity. When I asked Col. Clark why Iraqi army or police couldn’t be used to make sure nobody entered the mosques with weapons, he was quick to say, “We never hesitate” to fire back when fired upon. “However,” he added, “our fight requires strict cultural and religious sensitivity in order to be successful and legitimize the Iraqi government and army.” If, he said, “the Iraqi army and Iraqi police established check points and conducted security screens at mosques it would undoubtedly be viewed negatively by the Iraqi people whose trust is vital to our success.” [snip]

The U.S. strategy in Ramadi is to improve relations with the civilians – who are more sympathetic than you might think because they passionately hate the foreign Arabs and their efforts to impose radical Islam on Iraqis – and to keep the insurgency in check as the size and abilities of the local Iraqi army and police improve. The coalition inflicts grossly disproportionate casualties – 1st Battalion and its support elements routinely kill more jihadists in a day than the entire unit has lost since arriving. Yet this incredible kill ratio is also disturbing. It seems that no matter how readily they’re mowed down, the bad guys just keep on coming and coming.

I am in awe of the courage and dedication of our troops. I also marvel at Michael Fumento’s bravey. He has done an extraordinary service to document the heroism of those who fight for us.

[Cross-posted in Guns and Butter Blog]