The Kwangju Uprising, 5-1-8 (oh-il-pal)
by Richardson ~ May 18th, 2006. Filed under: History.Kwangju (a.k.a. Gwangju) was the unfortunate site of an uprising and brutal reprise by the South Korean government, as well as the source of a myth (at least partly the result of slipshod, biased research) leading to layer of anti-Americanism that still exists. Over the years, the “Kwangju Sa-tae” (Kwangju Uprising) has been revised to the “Kwangju Democratic Movement,” so something to that effect. I prefer the original title as it, in my opinion, is more truthful.
Recommended reading:
Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising
Background & History:
Kwangju May 1980 photographs
Gwangju massacre
Recent News:
Korea Times: Kwangju Becomes 1st Day Campaign Battleground
Chosun Ilbo: Gwangju Tragedy Could Have Been Averted: Roh
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May 18th, 2006 at 2:50 pm
Say is it oh-il-pal pr oh-pal-pal?
Hey it’s a joke but seriously the history of this armed uprising rewritten by liberal leftist commie agents on the fringe of what they learned (and directed) from teacher comrades up north.
Fact is msot of these thugs raided the local armory after getting beat up for protesting under guise of democracy and attacked elite ROK paratroopers. What’s any government to do?
Want does of real history? There has been numerous armed uprisings even in US history and you guessed it - national guards shot on armed thugs.
May 18th, 2006 at 3:08 pm
I tried to get into this topic last year by reading one of the English language books out by reporters who covered it.
It left more questions than answers.
I did come away with one firm conclusion: the secondary title was wrong — “Korea’s Tianamen”….whatever Kwangju was, it was no Tianamen.
Putting it along side some of the events in the US in the 60s and 70s would be a better fit though Kwangju was on a much larger scale.
I found I was pretty far against the student leaders who refused to back down after the bloodiest days, and I got fed up with the foreign reporters who came in after the worst part and then painted the student leaders as heros.
What caused me to come away with the same question marks were the few items here and there describing what had been going on in Kwangju before the first day of major bloodshed —- things like one of the members of the protesting groups talking about having raided a local police station and “disarming” the policemen.
There is no questoin the events in Kwangju spurred on Korea’s move toward democracy. So, I guess the student leader who wanted to become a martyre (sp?) did move Korea toward that goal.
It is also true some of the violent protests, and even some of the civil rights leaders who advocated armed clashes, in the US helped push reformation of American society forward as well.
But, there is a reason names like Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. are praised the most….
and we need to keep reminding ourselves why their message of non-violent resistance - even in the face of violence - is so special.
May 18th, 2006 at 9:49 pm
KL, have you ever done a post dissecting the Shorrock arguments. You mention ’slipshod, biased research’. Could you elaborate, or rather, have you elaborated on this before?
May 18th, 2006 at 10:14 pm
Short answer is: not yet, in-depth at least. And that is for myself, not James or Joshua.
The problems with Shorrock are that; a) his claims interpret facts, and always in the most negative light (e.g., if an event could be taken two or more ways, the most damaging is selected, and assumed to be a ‘fact’), and; b) he does not cite anything specifically, and has refused me twice by email (requests made a few years apart) to elaborate with cable numbers, instead he just says that the date (or approximate) and circumstances are enough.
Many of the State and DoD officials he paints in the worst light have protested and provided the ‘rest of the story,’ but the damage was done. Shorrock’s ‘paper’ was taken by many on the Korean-left as an affirmation of their view. He’s basically another Cumings (i.e., an apologist).
I am currently going through his ‘paper’ to match date with events for a Freedom of Information request for the same cables. Unlike Shorrock, I plan on scanning/posting them. And picking his paper to pieces. But it takes time – the govt is slow, and there is that pesky job. But it will come.
May 19th, 2006 at 4:43 am
Richardson,
I’d love to see or get emails of scans.
Spook,
I don’t know if you can call this “in depth” because I dind’t go about digging up resources to refute him - but I did a review of his article picking apart its internal logic and argumentation style.
http://usinkorea.org/issues/kwangju/index.htm
I felt from the 1st reading in 1996 or 1997 — if you read the quotes he uses by themselves, you would think he was trying to lead you to conclusions exactly opposite to the ones he actually makes.
I found myself writing “No it doesn’t” and “stretch” in the margins of the printed out article throughout my first read, and I knew nothing about Kwangju 1980 at the time besides what some Korean adults had told me.
In another article he wrote later, he complained that the US media “buried” his story even though it was so shocking and had been such a big hit in South Korea.
I would say it is one of the times the US media showed some common sense.
His article is very weak. It runs all over itself, and it uses hyperbole as a verifiction method:
for example, in describing how ruthless the SK government was — and how the US knew this and is thus guilty by association at least (he never really defines what guilt he claims the US has over Kwangju - just letting you pick which level you feel more comfortable with) by saying how the Korean government forces used CS Gas which “some” consider a type of “chemical warfare”
—well, yes…if you used tear gas in a war, it would be a form of chemical warfare. The same for pepper spray.
So, I guess developed democracies all over the world routinely use “chemical warfare” against rioters……
But, I would change part of what Richardson wrote in his comment —-
much more than the left in Korea was very significantly influenced by Shorrock’s monstrousity.
I went looking for it on the internet, because virtually all of my adult students (aged 20-35 normally) knew about it and it was frequently brought up with the Kwangju Massacre.
Not the articles title specifically — but students kept saying again and again how some American scholar had “proven” the US knew and approved of the massacre beforehand — that they had seen it on the Korean news who ran with the story.
I’m not teaching in Korea any more, but I bet you will still find many Korean adults who would say it was proven the US took part in the Kwangju massacre who have in mind the media firestorm this article created in the mid to late 1990s.
May 19th, 2006 at 5:23 am
Yes, I’m looking forward to other posters rebuttals of Shorrock. I read alot of that report in the past and agree that his conclusions are dubious. I read some of the reports he cites and came to different conclusions than he does. I often found myself thinking “Well, no, it doesn’t say that.” and like usinkorea said, he often interprets in the most negative way. This guy is a hack. It’s too bad his article has had such a huge influence in Korea. It’s quite disgusting, really.
May 19th, 2006 at 5:58 am
Richardson
Would you mind elaborating on your comment that you think “Kwangju Uprising” is a more appropriate name than “Kwangju Democratic Movement”? Thank you.
May 19th, 2006 at 6:50 am
While the student protests that sparked a military crackdown were a reaction to martial law being imposed, and there is absolutely no excuse for what the ROK Army (ROKA) did (how far they went at first), what happened afterwards is more truthfully described as “mob mentality” than any part of a democratic movement.
Basically students rioted after martial law was imposed, the ROKA over-reacted to that (per ROKG orders), and things escalated from there to the point that citizens overran weapons depots and even had a machine gun emplacement on top of a hospital.
Why martial law? There was tension over President Chun’s taking office and students, among others countrywide, were protesting that. Could such protests be linked to the actual democratic movement? Of course – but when the mob took over, at some point the “protest” became an “uprising.” It became an armed rebellion.
I don’t think that is mere semantics; there is a real difference between protest and uprising, even if related at the outset. One can hit a miscreant politician over the head with a bat and call it freedom of expression, but it’s still assault.
Kwangju was adopted by the democratic movement in Korea after the fact.
More on this in a few (or maybe several) months, after my FOIA documents arrive.
May 19th, 2006 at 7:14 am
The fact most citizens of Kwangju backed away from the core university students and others who took over the citizen’s committees by pushing out people who differed from their desire to become martyers tends to point me away from viewing it as a “democratic movement” and toward “an uprising”.
May 19th, 2006 at 11:09 am
I’ve read the following books on Kwangju:
‘Eye on Korea – An insider account of Korean-American Relations’ by James V. Young
‘Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age’ by Lee Jai-eui
‘Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence - Carter and Korea in crisis’ by William H. Gleysteen Jr.
‘The Kwangju Uprising – Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea’s Tiananmen’ edited by Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jae Eui
‘The 1980 Kwangju Uprising after 20 Years – The unhealed wounds of the victims’ edited by Juna Byun and Linda S. Lewis
I was particularly struck by the accounting given in ‘Eye on Korea’, with its portrayal of the circumstances surrounding Kwangju, as seen through the eyes of a mid-level career soldier not having an ax to grind or an agenda to push (in contrast to Mr. Tim Shorrock).
May 19th, 2006 at 12:31 pm
I think it was Lee Jae-Eui’s accounts of the situation in Kwangju that I found the most difficult to digest.
Most Koreans, except older conservative ones, want you to believe Kwangju was a shining example of resistance to dictatorship by heroic advocates of freedom and democracy —- basically a boomerang interpretation from the “bunch of commie bastards” one the authoritarian government sold after the massacre.
Outsiders, especailly foreign reporters, influenced by the global times in which Kwangju 1980 happened, the same people who championed “democratic” uprisings in South and Central American nations and Africa when “socialism” was still deemed a viable alternative to the ills of liberal capitalistic democracy, have also wanted to paint a best or better picture of the protest leaders and members in Kwangju.
But, from bits and pieces I have caught here and there, I can’t swallow this interpretation well.
I can’t bring myself to saying Kwangju was Korea’s Tiananmen.
And what bothers me is that there is a concept worth saving that gets destroyed if we make Kwangju Korea’s Tiananmen:
It is hard enough for mankind to follow the wisdom of Gandhi.
If we dilute it by applying it to situations like Kwangju, it becomes even harder.
Non-violent resistance to oppression — rather than turning to violence and bloodshed - even when right is on your side — even when excessive violence is being used by the authorities against your movement —- is something to be praised and it has been proven to make progress in places like India or the US or the former Soviet Union and so on.
I’m still conflicted about Kwangju 1980 — because I can accept the use of violence by citizens against an oppressive government. I don’t rule out that means altogether.
And I can’t say one way or another if Korea 1980 was a place and setting in which I would have accepted the use of violence or not…..
But I know which I prefer greatly —- the use of non-violence.
And it dawned on me today
didn’t Kim Dae Jung fight hard for democracy in Korea for decades — effectively push the government (though ultimate success to a long time) —- wihtout preaching the need for violent resistance or a violent defense against oppression?
That is praise worthy….
I’m not too sure at all the leaders in Kwangju 1980 deserve such praise or the same level of praise…..
May 19th, 2006 at 11:58 pm
Ah, leave it to the Kwangju Uprising to bring me out of a long self-imposed moratorium on commenting for Korea blogs! How can I resist?
I believe I have gotten into arguments with usinkorea about the nature of Kwangju before, so I don’t wish to rehash all of that. But it seems that usinkorea has come around to a more charitable (if still conflicted) view of the uprising, which is welcome.
When thinking about Kwangju, the most important thing is not to consider it as a monolith. The whole uprising lasted ten days (May 18-27, 1980), was preceded by an extensive buildup, and in some ways has never really ended. The entire city was involved and the movement was by no means unified, being comprised of several factions who struggled to hammer out a list of demands to present to the government, only to dwindle to a group of hard-core student leaders who held out on the final day. The importance of the Kwangju legacy/ies today can be readily seen from the attempted appropriation of May 18 by the protestors in P’yongtaek, a tactic which is ridiculous yet totally predictable for anyone familiar with recent Korean history.
Please read Linda Lewis’s book “Laying Claim to the Memory of May.” I can’t second Richardson’s recommendation enough.
One warning: Do not use the term “Kwangju sat’ae” in Korea (particularly in Cholla-do) unless you have a death wish! I’m sure this was just an inadvertent mistake by Richardson, but “Kwangju sat’ae” actually means “Kwangju incident” and was the name used by the military regime at the time to discredit the uprising as a riot by lawless hooligans. “Kwangju uprising” is “Kwangju hangjaeng.” Survivors and many others prefer that designation over “Kwangju minjuhwa undong” (”Kwangju democratization movement”), which is the official government term. I agree with that sentiment, since “minjuhwa undong” is a bit too sanitized for my taste. Of course you can never go wrong with just “5.18.”
I have been accused before of unsympathetically supporting a leftist-nationalist narrative of the uprising. I do not. Certainly many of the most radical students were sympathetic to North Korea, but 1980 was not 2006, and the mere holding of these views should never constitute a crime. To this day I have never seen any convincing evidence that North Korean agents sent by Pyongyang played any role in instigating any demonstrations in Kwangju. It is certainly possible that North Korean agents were coincidentally present in Kwangju at the time, as they were in many cities.
North Korea, for its part, has been griping about Kwangju for 26 years and counting, although I think the state media realizes that now that the ROK government is busy co-opting Kwangju for its own ends, such propaganda is not as useful as it once was.
On Kwangju and Tiananmen: I actually do think Kwangju was as important as Tiananmen historically, but I’m by no means an expert on Tiananmen and I admit that since I’ve done a lot of research on Kwangju I am a bit attached to the subject. Tiananmen is more important than Kwangju in the American imagination for three reasons. One, Kwangju occurred before the advent of 24-hour cable news, while Tiananmen was extensively covered by American television. Two, Tiananmen happened in the heart of the Chinese capital, while Kwangju was a provincial backwater. And three, the narrative of protests for democracy against a communist regime, particularly the explicitly pro-American imagery of the protests (goddess of liberty statue), struck a chord with Americans. I’m not trying to be overly cynical with that statement, I just mean to say that the Kwangju story at the time would not have provided a clear-cut good-vs.-evil narrative of the type that visual media love to follow.
Finally, if you get a chance to visit Kwangju, hop on bus #25-2 and go visit the National May 18 Cemetery. It’s worth the long ride to the outskirts of town. Don’t leave without checking out the old cemetery at the top of the hill, which will give you a better sense of the victims’ identities than the somewhat standardized design of the newer memorial.
May 20th, 2006 at 12:23 am
If I remember our previous discussion centered on the idea of NK agents???
I would probably consider the student leaders who took over the people’s committee who refused to negociate with the outside authorities and wanted to be martyered such agents though I have never heard any proof of that —- because by agents, I mean NK inspired too.
Anyway….
I don’t like people putting Tiananmen and Kwangju together.
I believe we should give a much more special place to movements that seek peaceful resistence even in the face of violence.
The protesters and leadership in Kwangju did not rise above what is the more common human response to oppression. They chose to meet violence with violence.
May 21st, 2006 at 1:30 am
I’d also like to recommend the book ‘Korea on the Brink’ by John Wickham, the general who was in charge of USFK at the time of the Park assassination, the Chun coup, and Kwangju. It’s been awhile since I read the book, but what I recall most vividly was the ‘wag the dog’ tone of the general’s memoir. As I said, it’s been some time since I read the book, but I remember Wickham basically saying:
1) USFK had very little information on the uprising as it was happening. Chun had effectively cut off media access and there weren’t so many ‘eyes’ on the ground that Wickham and other U.S. decision-makers could rely on.
2) USFK was concerned first and foremost with security on the Korean peninsula, and the fear that the North might try to exploit the crises was very real for Wickham and Washington. 1979 was something of a watershed year for revolutions around the world (Iran, Nicaragua), and the various players on the US side were acutely aware of this.
3) This is probably the most contentious, especially since Wickham has come off as one of the main ‘bad guys’ of Kwangju and had an axe to grind when he wrote his account, but the general’s memoir does seem to indicate that the decision to allow the ROK army to take units away from the front to re-deploy to Kwangju was something of a fait accompli. In fact, Wickham continually makes the case (in contrast to what many Koreans believe) that the US had limited influence over Korean decision-making.
For anyone interested in Kwangju, I consider the Wickham book a must-read. Yes, he has a vested interest in this. He’s always come off as one of the villians, and you get the sense that he’s none too pleased to have a rather distinguished career boiled down to ‘the guy who sanctioned Kwangju’. But he makes many persuasive arguments, and his book is a vital record of what was going on in the mind of a key player at the time.
One other thing, I also find it interesting that Shorrock suggests that all the US decisions about Kwangju were coming out of Washington. I believe Wickham suggests that much of the debate over what to do was happening in Korea (USFK) and between USFK and Washington.
May 21st, 2006 at 7:26 pm
On Wickham’s book, one thing that I can see tending to come off bad to many typical readers is how he emphasises the idea of worrying about the North.
For one reason, it’s easy for people to forget the climate of the time in favor of wanting to give maximum sympathy to those who suffered in Kwangju.
And for another how easy it is for people to overlook the man’s primary function.
Since he was a VIP of the US government in Korea, it is natural to lump him together with the Ambassdaor and whoever. But, it should be no suprise his overriding focus was on the military situation. It was his job.
May 22nd, 2006 at 6:25 am
I always use “Kwangju Satae,” and always will on principle. In fact when I was there a couple of years ago and asked directions to the “Kwangju Satae myoji” (cemetery), I had no problems.
A couple of leftist grad students in Seoul tried to correct my terminology, much to their frustration. If they want to blame the U.S. for Kwangju, I’ll see them wince every time I say “satae.”
May 22nd, 2006 at 11:33 am
On what “principle” do you always use “Kwangju sat’ae”? The principle of sticking it to uppity leftist students? “Minjuhwa undong” would be preferable to “sat’ae.” If you don’t like “hangjaeng,” just use “5.18.” “Kwangju incident” sounds neutral in English, but “Kwangju sat’ae” is not neutral in Korean due to its historical usage. Saying “sat’ae” just to spite people who believe that the U.S. is responsible for Kwangju would be like saying “alleged Japanese atrocities during the occupation” to spite people who are overly zealous about Tokto.
May 22nd, 2006 at 12:08 pm
No, sticking it to leftist students is not the only reason. ‘Kwangju Satae,’ has been used in the Western academic community for decades, and I seen no need to conform to South Korean revisionism, especially in the case of a mob mentality ‘incident’ now, in my opinion, inappropriately romanticized. If people get upset for having a spade called a spade, oh well.
As I said, I used that terminology in Kwangju with absolutely no problem. The only odd looks I got were a bit of astonishment from locals when I understood what they were talking about.
May 23rd, 2006 at 11:31 am
The exaggeration and the mythic revisionism of Kwangju remind me of the similar process of myth-making regarding Korean “resistance” to — in reality, widespread collaboration with — the Japanese occupation.
This is not to deny the repression nor the brutality of the military junta of 1980, of course.
Kwangju has become such a mythic event that a measured retrospective is all but impossible in Korea.
As I wrote before:
May 24th, 2006 at 1:00 pm
We are back to where we were last year, talking about how Kwangju is “inappropriately romanticized.” I rather doubt that “sat’ae” was “used in the Western academic community for decades.” There was almost nothing widely available in English about 5.18 until around 1999, and I don’t recall “sat’ae” appearing in an earlier work from 1987. The only time I’ve seen “sat’ae” used in a Korean book about 5.18 was in a now out-of-print translation of memoirs by an American missionary who witnessed the uprising (the book’s Korean title was “5.18 Kwangju Sat’ae”).
I rather doubt you would continue to call 5.16 a “kunsa hyongmyong” as it was called for decades. Pretty much everyone uses “coup d’etat.”
Naming of historical events is contentious in any context. Use “sat’ae” if you want, but don’t pretend it’s the most objective or neutral choice. Personally, I have only ever heard it used by people in Kyongsang-do.
I’m certainly not one to deny that on occasion the situation in Kwangju has been exaggerated. For example, it is routine to read statements to the effect that unlike every other revolutionary movement in history, after the military was driven out, the city was calm and the citizens cooperated in total peace. The important question is who is doing the romanticizing. I would point to two groups: the current ROK government and the radical student groups such as Hanchongryon. The ROK government wants to convince everyone that they the political heirs to the 5.18 movement even though most people realize that this is a sham. Hanchongryon students, in turn, believe that by lording it over the 5.18 cemetery during the anniversary ceremonies, as they did in 2003, they can claim the Kwangju legacy for themselves.
The participants in the uprising are caught in the middle of all this. They resent the politicians using them for personal gain, but they don’t agree with the students either. (At the anniversary ceremony in 2003, one of the uprising veterans I know complained to me, “These kids think they know what democracy is, but they have no idea.”) A detailed narrative and analysis of this fight over 5.18 is what makes Linda Lewis’s work so important.
James’s comparison with Japanese colonialism is interesting. From my experience, Koreans are very aware of the history of collaboration with the Japanese. They are just eager to demonstrate that their ancestors and/or political idols are not tainted with it, and to use the taint of collaboration to damage others politically. The real problem is not that Koreans think they resisted the Japanese when in reality they collaborated. The problem is ANY framework that uses the strict collaboration/resistance binary. I see this all the time in Korean scholarship: the “some collaborated, others resisted” meme. (Still, many people mistakenly think that Korean scholars are still resistant to honest examinations of the colonial period. While this might have been true 15 years ago, for younger scholars it is decidedly not the case today.)
I find it very interesting that if I dispute the reactionary view of Richardson (”a mob mentality ‘incident’” he says!) I am scolded for romanticizing Kwangju, when in reality all I am trying to do is point to the complexity of the event and remind everyone that like any other contentious period of Korean history, it involved many factions whose advocates are still fighting over its meaning.
May 15th, 2007 at 12:05 pm
[Note: in looking over comments for this post, I see that two did not make the export/import from the Korea Liberator - this is the second to last comment posted there in May 2006, where comments are now closed. --Richardson]
It can be found in at least dozens of journal articles. I’m on an extended business trip, and don’t live near my school’s library at any rate, so can’t go dig up a pile of sources. If you can get to the U of Hawaii or UC libraries, you can locate them.
It sounds like your knowledge of this is rather limited to more recent times, and probably influenced by revisionist work. Books are a small part of the academic world, which thrives mostly on journal publications.
Get off your high horse – it an *accurate* description, which is what I aim for, and I don’t care who it offends.
“Reactionary”? And you deny it was related to mob group dynamics? If you can’t be serious, why even reply?
By Richardson on 25 May 2006 6:53 am
May 15th, 2007 at 12:06 pm
[Note: in looking over comments for this post, I see that two did not make the export/import from the Korea Liberator - this is the last comment posted there in May 2006, where comments are now closed. --Richardson]
Not even close.
And that, in your view, is an accurate depiction of reality? Of this “awareness” you wrote above?
By James J. Na on 25 May 2006 8:19 am
March 27th, 2008 at 5:42 pm
I imagine that most of the people who read this will say “yeah, right” when I write that I was there. Or, rather, that I was in Taejon in school while my Presbyterian missionary parents, the Huntleys, along with my younger sister & brother were there.
It was called the Kwangju Sat’ae from the beginning (or rather, the end, when people could sit back and say “okay, what shall we call this…”).
The week before the incident, Korean troops were moved all around the country. I know this from friends and family who were traveling, and who saw large numbers of rowdy soldiers being transported north & south, who had different dialects from the places they were going.
The majority of active protesters at first were college students. College students demonstrated regularly in the 1970’s - probably monthly or more often - it was just something they did on a slow Saturday. Aggressive police response was rare, and an actual military response an over-reaction at best. There was definitely something fishy about the appearance of a pre-planned military response - it definitely smacked of a deliberate incitement of the students, in a province already known for being especially volatile. Also, the soldiers were not from a National Guard-type unit, but from a special warfare unit. Which again, sounds like either using a sledgehammer to kill a fly, or deliberately inciting trouble to use as support for a strong military leader, such as, oh, Chun Doo-Hwan.
When the military came in, their actions, which were pretty brutal, according to the eyewitness descriptions I got from Peace Corps volunteers later that summer. caused the demonstrations to move beyond peaceful. So, the regular citizens of the city started to fight back. Gangs and thugs took advantage of the opportunity at this point. When the military left, the gangs & thugs did take over the city.
Throughout, there were gunship helicopters overhead firing at people in the street. Besides teaching at the seminary, my father was the hospital chaplain at the hospital across the street from the mission compound. One of the first casualties brought into the hospital was a young teenage girl, who had been shot in the head. My dad also helped with a little boy, younger than 8, who was injured by bullet fragments.
The night before the military re-took control of the city, US air force men from the nearby airbase came to the mission compound and asked my parents and the other missionaries to leave, offering them safe escort out of the city. The Presbyterian & Baptist missionaries, the Catholic priests, and the Peace Corps volunteers all stayed.
A group of college students hid at my parents house for several days afterwards. My parents were meeting with the other missionaries, and Korean soldiers came to the door and asked my sister, who was about 10 years old, if any Korean young people were there. When she said no, they went away without incident. A few days later, my mother saw some young people they did not know come running through our compound. Soldiers followed shortly behind, and they heard machine gun fire. But they did not find blood or evidence that the young people had been shot.
I don’t know much about the level of U.S. political or military involvement in the incident. I do know that there was not active involvement by the U.S. military, but that they did provide some logistical support when the military was not actually in the city of Kwangju. And I do know that when Ronald Reagan met with Chun Doo-Hwan later that year, he made it very clear that Chun did NOT have the support of the American government to remain president beyond his immediate self-imposed term of office.
Considering the support given to the people of Kwangju by American citizens and the American government, the use of the Sat’ae to incite anti-American sentiment seems strange to me. But many people, Americans and otherwise, seem to thrive on anti-Americanism, whether from envy or guilt. They’re misled, but there’s no logic to appeal to, so no use arguing.
March 27th, 2008 at 11:26 pm
One thing to keep in mind about the ROK army at the time is that, it did not have the best C3I.
What I mean by that is this: there was much confusion among different parts of the ROK military forces in response to the incident or the uprising. There were rumors floating about the military units. This led to occasional “friendly fire” incidents among government forces.
What I am saying is that, such incidents demonstrate to me the military responses were likely ad hoc, rather than preplanned.