In my opinion, this book is at the top of the must reads for anyone who wants a well-grounded understanding of North Korea. If you want to understand the political history of the DPRK you must study Kim Il Sung rather than the system – Kim Il Sung was (and still is) the system.

Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader. Dae-Sook Suh. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. xxiii, 443 pp.

Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader examines and analyzes the life and circumstances of Kim Il Sung from his birth (April 15, 1912) until the books publication in 1988. Current printings also include the Preface to the paperback edition, which was written by the author in 1995 in response to renewed interest in the subject after Kim’s death on July 8, 1994. Particular attention is given to Kim’s revolutionary past, rise and consolidation of power, and dealings with South Korea, his relationship and difficulties with the former Soviet Union and China, Kim’s self-reliance ideology, Chuch’e (also transliterated as Juch’e or Juche, and also known as Kimilsungism) and the related shift in power from the party to the state, relations with the Third World, and the future of North Korea, including the role of Kim Jong Il, Kim’s eldest son by his first wife.

Information was derived from an exhaustive search of writings, speeches, interviews, proclamations, and related documents, including all available unclassified works of Kim in their original form (more than 700 items), official North Korean collections on Kim and related subjects, Chinese and Japanese police records and records of guerrilla activity in Manchuria including information on Kim’s comrades, writings from members of the Soviet occupational forces, important material seized by the US forces during the war, which was declassified in 1977 (government documents, photographs, newspapers, personal papers, etc.), and four sets of Kim’s revised works. These sources draw from all of the vital players in the region to create a clear picture of the larger framework that influenced the development of Kim and North Korea. The sources represent several languages, and the following transliteration systems were used: for Korean McCune-Reischauer was used except for commonly used names, Pinyin for Chinese, Hepburn for Japanese, and the Library of Congress system for Russian (note: Dr. Suh is literate in all the above languages). The book consists of seven parts for a total of eighteen chapters, four appendixes, a notes section, bibliography, and an index.

It is important to note that the book attempts neither to condemn nor to praise Kim Il Sung, but to portray an accurate, balanced, and undistorted look into the life and circumstances of one of the most controversial leaders the world has known, giving credit where it is due, and pointing out where it is not, thus “to distinguish fact from fiction” (p. 12).

Part I covers Kim’s beginnings and background, including his anti-Japanese guerrilla activity and accomplishments in Manchurian. Kim’s birth name was “Kim Sŏng-Ju,” which he changed to “Kim Il Sŏng” during his guerrilla days (“Sŏng” is commonly spelled as “Sung” in Kim’s case). Much of his early education was in China, which greatly facilitated his later anti-Japanese collaboration with the Chinese in Manchuria. The time period covering his guerrilla activity is controversial because North Korea has made many “exaggerated claims and unsubstantiated assertions… in their effort to trace the tradition of Korea communism to Kim and his guerrilla forces” (p. 2). Several examples of embellishment and invention are given, including the claim that he established a number of four-year elementary schools and taught students Marxism and dialectical materialism from Das Capital, and the assertion that Kim led a conference in 1933 with Chinese army leaders in which he persuaded them to place their forces under his command. Many similar examples are given, however “It is futile to challenge every assertion made by Kim’s sycophantic writers, and their errors are too obvious to warrant detailed refutation” (p. 8).

That Kim fought hard, well, and smartly is well documented. He is known to have fought widely and to have commanded up to 300 men. A spy sent by the Japanese “reported that Kim Il Sung was an able leader, constantly preaching to his men about international communism and Korean nationalism…” (p. 46). Given his family background and his level of education, Kim did very well for himself in Manchuria. However, in an attempt to create a hero out of himself, he neglected those that helped him attain his position, claimed non-existent records, and denied contradictory ones. “To refute Kim’s claims is not difficult. But more important than the false claims is his effort to build the tradition of Korean communism and Korean revolutionary spirit upon such fallacious foundation” (p. 53). He was not a “fake,” but false claims diminished his true accomplishments, and denied others theirs.

Part II discusses Kim’s rise to power, and the formation of the Workers Party of Korea, the republic, and army. Kim claimed to have triumphantly returned to Korea with a joint operation of his army and that of the Soviet Union, which came into Korea on August 26, 1945. However, Kim actually entered Korea on September 19, 1945, about three weeks later. In 1946 the Soviets created the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee with Kim as its head. In February 1948 the Soviets helped Kim create the Korean People’s Army, and he disarmed all others, which made his group the only armed group. The division of the peninsula with political concentration in Seoul allowed the Soviets to create a Soviet style system with little resistance, and they promoted Kim as a national hero. This allowed him to gain an upper hand over all other contenders for power, and solidified his control over North Korea.

“It is worthwhile explaining the details of the first congress because such information has not been made public heretofore” (p. 75). North Korea claims that Kim established the Worker’s Party of Korea on Oct. 10, 1945, but it was actually created on Aug. 28-30, 1946 as the merger between the New Democratic Party and the North Korean Communist Party during its founding congress, and initially Kim was not the chairman, but one of two vice-chairmen. That the much older and more established revolutionaries tolerated the younger lesser known Kim indicates Soviet coercion. Everyone who collaborated with the Japanese, or who was accused of doing so, was eliminated from leadership, taking care of many potential domestic rivals for Kim, and he formerly became chairman of the Worker’s Party of Korea on June 24, 1949.

Kim opposed the formation of two independent Korean governments, and waited until the south did so before the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formed, thus the Southern election actually helped assure his leadership in the North.

Part III examines both pre and post-war challenges to Kim’s leadership and how they were dealt with. The Korean War has always been analyzed from the cold war viewpoint that automatically considers it a Soviet-US ideological showdown, and omits the numerous and significant domestic causes and Kim’s political ambition. Domestic causes for the Korean War include the desire to reunify the country, difficulty with Kim’s 1949-1950 two-year economic plan, and his precarious relationship with communists from the South.

The South had a many more high level and able communists who could have challenged Kim’s leadership. By uniting the country he could elevate his own status and legitimacy above theirs. Kim built a much larger and stronger army than the South, with the advantage of having many battle-hardened troops, and even led soldiers in battle himself (p. 155). Kim saw the Korean situation as being similar to the Chinese one in that it was a civil war, but failed to recognize the difference in that the North and South were now separate nations, and the South had recognition by the UN, very unlike the Chinese situation. Politically, Kim had few confrontations during the war, and all who opposed Kim were completely crushed.

After the war, Kim conceded that the truce was a stalemate, but later claimed a Northern victory and ignored the Chinese contribution. Politically, Kim eliminated all who posed the threat of being even a potential rival, and “promoted himself as the chief propagator and the defender of the Korean revolution” (p. 141). This period was the beginning of the creation of the tradition of his struggle in Manchuria as the only tradition.

When Stalin died and de-Stalinization began in the Soviet Union, it made Kim’s position less secure, hence on December 28, 1955 the first mention of Chuch’e is heard in a speech, which he described as patriotic, rather than nationalistic. Soon historical studies began to blend in “grossly exaggerated accounts of his partisan exploits with traditional Korean history” (p. 147). “Kim spoke with authority on any subject, and no one dared question anything he said” (p. 154), and “For domestic Communists, the trail and execution of their leaders put an end to any organized challenge to Kim’s leadership” (p. 156). In the final analysis of that period, “Kim Il Sung met all these challenges masterfully” (p. 157).

Part IV deals with reconstruction after the war, and with the difficulties North Korea faced during the Sino-Soviet, Soviet-Korean, and Sino-Korean disputes. The need to produce and rebuild after the war caused Kim to urge the workers to do more, and “The impact of Kim’s personal guidance, not merely the merit of what he prescribed, was strongly felt by workers in the industrial sector and helped them to make superhuman efforts…” (p. 168).

By the time of the Fourth Party Congress in September of 1961 Kim’s power position was solidified domestically, and the indoctrination of the nation and myth building about Kim and his Partisans was easy to accomplish. He now had only the task of building his socialist nation.
Out of necessity and for tactical reasons, Kim wanted to stay neutral during the Sino-Soviet dispute, however Khrushchev’s position of “peaceful coexistence” with the West was incompatible for divided Korea, and the anti-Stalin revisionism bothered Kim, who had idolized Stalin.

North Korea tried to remain neutral during the dispute, but eventually supported China on the basis that China could not be ignored because it consisted of two-thirds of the socialist population, and that leadership should be Sino-Soviet, not only Soviet.

The Soviet-Korean dispute began after the North was humiliated at international meeting for support of China, and initially took the form of criticism of the Soviet Union for incorrect Korean history texts. North Korea also argued that the Soviets should not impose their party platform on other parties. There was no “running controversy on any subject similar to the controversies with the Soviet Union and China” (p. 188), and after “the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the North Koreans did try to readjust their relationship with the Soviet Union, irrespective of the persistent Chinese difficulties with the new leadership…,” (p. 189) however, the relationship was an adjustment to the new circumstances rather than a restoration of old ties.

The Sino-Korean dispute was very different from the Soviet-Korean dispute in two ways: Korea did not overtly criticize China, and it was much more serious. “Contrary to the common view that the North Korean pendulum swung back and forth in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the North Koreas viewed their position as firm as they tried to maintain their independence between Soviet revisionism and Chinese dogmatism” (p. 189). The China-Korea problems did not come so much from the Korean efforts to normalize with Russia, but from the ”radical Red Guard movement of the Cultural Revolution” (p. 190).

The two main points were the Red Guards personal attacks on Kim, and a northern border dispute over Mt. White Head (Paektusan in Korean, Changbaishan in Chinese), which had actually been in dispute at times as early as 1712. “The deterioration was serious enough to prompt the recall of the ambassadors to Beijing and Pyongyang” (p. 192). In 1970 an unofficial report from Taiwan stated that an agreement had been reached. Through the Sino-Soviet-Korean disputes, Kim remained as neutral as possible and did not compromise his basic principles.

Part V looks at the problems North Korea faced with the military, economy, and with the South, after attaining real independence. Stalin died and Khrushchev took power in the Soviet Union, later leading to some of the disputes outlined above.

Around the same timeframe as the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kim more decisively consolidated power at the Fourth Party Congress in 1961 and placed many more of his Partisans into positions of power, especially in the military. At the same time several factors came together that caused military development at the expense of the national economy: North Korean support for China lost it much needed Soviet military and economic support; the Partisans “insisted on strengthening national defense by modernizing the armed forces” (p. 212); and the corrupt Rhee government in the South, which was not a challenge to Kim, was replaced by the more organized and military trained Park, who was viewed as a very potential threat. When Soviet relations were restored in 1964, Soviet technicians returned, trade began again, and both economic and military growth became possible.

By 1968 Kim had realized that the partisan generals had both positive and negative effects – his people were in command, but they caused problems with the modernization of the military, which detracted from efforts to boost the economy, as well as dangerous escapades militarily. After the 1969 EC-121 incident, in which the American spy plane was shot down, about ten of the highest-ranking generals were removed, which also signaled the end of the ‘60’s military policy.

The economy was the new focus, and Kim encouraged the people to work harder. Kim is quoted as saying “most of our workers do not work for money, nor do they need any material incentive. They demand nothing more than the state’s guarantee of their livelihood, and they work conscientiously” (p. 242). Because Kim did not back down from the Soviets, the Chinese, the South, or the Americans, he gained much respect and “was idolized by the people” (p. 210).

Part VI discusses interaction with the South and the Third World, the shift from the party to the state, and Kim’s semiretirement as he began transferring power to his son, Kim Jong Il.

Meetings were held in 1972 to exchange views on reunification, and a joint communiqué was issued. However, Kim was inflexible in his formula, and “When he found that the South Koreans had not been enlightened about his policies but in fact differed in their interpretation of the basic policy embodied in the joint communiqué, he was no longer interested in the dialogue” (p. 256).

From the late 1950’s to the late 1970’s Kim established diplomatic relations with many countries, and joined the UN, which gained recognition for the North as a legitimate nation. However, the lack of trained personnel, foreign exchange, language skilled personnel, and knowledge of diplomatic standards outside of communist nations, as well as illegal activity and a general abuse of diplomatic immunity, tarnished the already less than favorable image of the North even more. In the Third World, where he tried to implant his Chuch’e ideology and gain recognition, “Kim had to learn the hard way that he had neither the resources nor the charisma to appeal to the people of the Third World” (267).

In December of 1972 changes were made in the constitution, for the first time since 1948, which promoted Kim from Premier to President. This was not a declared shift of policy, but the constitution change was significant because it officially shifted from Communist Party orientation to that of an independent state and autonomous leader with a title separate from the Party.

Even more significant was the replacement of communist ideology with that of Chuch’e. The change may also have been meant to help promote his “leadership of the non-aligned nations, and to equalize his position with that of the South Korean president” (p. 275). Also in the early 1970’s Kim chose Kim Jong Il to succeed him, and began to give him assignments that would prepare him for leadership. This was done in a private manner and was smoothly set into motion when Kim became president and arranged for Kim Jong Il to take leadership of the party, under Kim’s close supervision (p. 276-277). Propaganda followed and Kim Jong Il was projected as the “party center” (p. 278). Many improbable stories of Kim Jong Il’s amazing accomplishments soon followed, making it difficult to gauge his true ability and accomplishments (285-285).

Part VII examines Kim’s ideology of Chuch’e, and the final chapter is an overall evaluation of what Kim has done. Chuch’e is projected by Kim as a universal truth and a “creative application of Marxism and Leninism to the condition peculiar to the country” in the spirit of self-reliance (p. 301). Most important the concept of the supreme leader, or suryŏng – each state should have their own suryŏng “to establish unity of thought and action” (p. 304). Chuch’e is basically a North Korean attempt to be self-sufficient, as a reaction to past domination. “As a political idea, however, it is an inadequate exposition of nationalism and has little relevance to the tenets of Marxism and Leninism” (p. 305), and the ideology did not really become prominent until the consequence of independence from Russia and China became clear – it was a necessity.

In the conclusion of the book and the overall evaluation of Kim, his real accomplishments – from his guerrilla days to his efforts to build a socialist nation – are recognized. However, also recognized are the exaggerations and unsubstantiated claims, which detract from his accomplishments, as well as the many mistakes in policy, the creation of a personality cult, his impractical unification policy, and ultimate failure to create the system he said he would. “He practices not communism in the so-called socialist state but a peculiar brand of oriental despotism” (p. 315). In the final analysis:

Kim’s biggest failure has been his inability to build and refine a socialist political system that will survive him. Instead, what he has built in the North is a political system to accommodate his personal rule, and he has had to appoint his son heir to prolong his republic. In this sense, Kim has betrayed the hopes of all those Koreans who fought to establish a Communist system of government in Korea and died for that cause (p. 324).

Considering the conclusion in light of the objectives outlined in the Preface – to portray an accurate, balanced, and undistorted look into the life and accomplishments of Kim Il Sung – it is clear that the book did just that. The reader can trace Kim from a skillful and ambitious guerrilla leader, to the somewhat insecure leader of North Korea, to an unconditional leader, and finally to semiretirement and, to some extent, idleness, as the reigns of power were quietly passed to his son.

Credit is given where it is due, particularly in Kim’s guerrilla days in Manchuria, where he proved himself to be unflinchingly anti-Japanese and patriotic, and his deft handling of the difficult situations presented by the Sino and Soviet disputes, where he stood his ground.

The book was also critical of Kim, but not for the normal types of mistakes that all leaders make and that are easy to point out with the advantage of historical hindsight that we now have, but primarily for the creation and perpetuation of an extreme and hypocritical personality cult (which also denied others their just recognition), for failing to create or adapt a viable unification policy, and for creating a despotic monarchy rather than the socialist system he promised, betraying the Koreans that fought for him in the process.

The content of the book was especially convincing in that in drew from many diverse sources not usually available, and constructed them in an orderly, logical, and fairly objective manner. For those same reasons the book does indeed contribute to advancing knowledge on the subject.

Much of the other information available on the topic is very subjective and offers either the (majority) Western viewpoint that Kim was the personification of evil and a Soviet puppet, or the absurd North Korean propaganda portraying him as a godlike savior. This book, however, from the beginning offered a balanced, thorough, and objective view, utilizing many sources to explain the big picture in a cohesive and comprehensive way.

Several points concerning Kim and his actions that I had been unsure of were explained in detail. For example, I had heard that there was substantial doubt as to whether or not Kim Il Sung the leader was the actual Kim Il Sung who was a guerrilla in Manchuria, a subject that was fully addressed in the text with his name change in Manchuria and some of the reasoning behind it.

At first I one might think that the assessment of Kim’s accomplishments are too kind, but I judge they fair and objective, and in the end Kim is labeled for what he was.