Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, Revised and Updated. Indianapolis: Basic Books, 1997& 2001. 445 pages.

Oberdorfer’s The Two Koreas is a well-presented modern history of both North and South Korea, as the title indicates. It includes dozens of interesting quotes and insights Oberdorfer was able to collect over several decades as a Washington Post reporter in NE Asia. I consider it a must-read source for any Korea-watcher.

While the first chapter gives background information about the Korean War, the early years of Kim Il Sung, and a few other essential details, the real history of the book begins in the mid-sixties after Park Chung Hee became president in the South. The book contains a preface and 16 chapters, basically following the events (with detail) from the mid-sixties until early 2001.

My overall opinion of the book is very favorable, and I recommend this book to everyone interested in Korea. I particularly enjoyed the first-hand accounts of North Korea and prominent Koreans from both the North and South.

If you’ve read Korea’s place in the Sun by Comrade Bruce Cumings, reading The Two Koreas is kind of like the rest of the story. For example, Cumings makes Reagan’s meeting with Chun in 1980 seem like a wink to ROK Army actions in Kwangju, omitting that it likely saved Kim Dae-jung’s life, and ignoring the context of a possible North-South conflict at that turbulent time.

Primary topics and interesting points:

• Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung both appear to be micro-managers, and Yushin reminds me of a parallel, if very different, type of mobilizing idea when compared to Juch’e. (35).
• After he wife was killed in the botched assassination attempt, Park finished his speech! (48)
• Ambassador Sneider noting in 1972 that just knowing for sure about long-term security guarantees by the US would do much to form the policy of Kim and Park, and help with stability. (66)
• The 1972 beginnings of the first NK (failed) attempt at a nuclear power program with the French, and the 1973 drive for the same in the South. (69)
• Details of the 1976 ax murder of two US officers in the DMZ (which still makes me angry when I read the details of the beatings/murders). (74)
• Chapter 4, “The Carter Chill,” and Carter’s illogical and seemingly emotional position that US troops must be withdrawn from Korea, including all the concerns this caused in SK and Japan. Led to worries, but also to more NK trust ~ speedy return of US chopper crew in 1977. (from page 84, also see 86, 89, 92, 94 & 95)
• Carter’s distrust of intelligence analysis (from sat. photos) of NK mil. strength. (101-103)
• Carter apparently ignorant of US restraints on SK military size, his comments on why SK did not build an army to match NK. (106)
• “The Coming of Chun Doo Hwan,” (116) and events of 12/12 사태. (119)
• “The Kwangju Uprising” (124) Leads me to believe there was actually no US involvement in the decision to attack demonstrators so harshly, but the opposite. (125, 127, & especially 129)
• “The Fight to Save Kim Dae Jung.” (133) Must reading.
• Korean Airlines flight 007 (shot down by the USSR as a spy plane). (139)
• The 1983 Rangoon, Burma (Yangon, Myanmar) assassination attempt of Chun, the strange timing, and the confusion as to who (in NK) was actually responsible. (from 144)
• “One of the lessons of the quarter-century of North-South dialogue is that I rarely made progress unless the top leaders were involved.” Still seemingly true. (148-149)
• “Materials recently made public from Soviet archives depict a central role for Stalin, suggesting that he personally insisted on continuing the war foe well over a year after Kim was ready to seek a negotiated way out.” (152)
• “The Battle for Democracy in Soul,” chapter 7 (161), and Chun’s “succession struggle. (162)
• “The Election of 1987” (172)
• “The Great Olympic Coming Out Party,” chapter 8. (179)
• KAL flight 858, October 7, 1987 (bomb planted by NK spy Kim Hyon Hui). (183)
• Roh and Nordpolitik. (from 186)
• “Moscow Switches Sides,” chapter 9. (197)
• “China Shifts It’s Ground,” chapter 10. (229)
• The death of Kim Il Sung. (from chapter 14, 337) “Within a few hours, Pyongyang hospitals were overrun with heart attack victims.” (342)
• “The Succession of Kim Jong Il.” (345) Note the change of terminology on page 347.
• Kim Jong Il’s attitude on adapting some Western methods. (349)
• Kim Jong Il’s health – reports of heart trouble, diabetes, epilepsy, and kidney disease. (350)
• More on the nuclear reactors. (365)
• “North Korea in Crisis,” chapter 15. (369)
• Notes apparent lack of economic, political, and military objectives. (376)
• Arrests of Chun and Roh. (from 376)
• “The Submarine Incursion.” (from 387, see top of 390 & 393)
• “North Korea’s Steep Decline.” (393)
• The defection of Hwang Jang Yop, the “architect” of Juch’e. (399)
• The Sunshine Policy. (from 406)
• “Turn Towards Engagement,” chapter 16 [last chapter]. (409)
• The August 1998 missile over Japan. (410)
• “Toward and Aid-Based State.” (414)
• Some of Perry’s conclusions. (419)
• And much more – too much to list here.

The book has several deficiencies:

• While citation of sources is given in the end of the book, arranged by chapter, nothing is actually cited in the text, i.e., there are not end or foot notes, making it very difficult to match sources up with quotes, etc. Clearly, this book is the work of a journalist, not an academic.
• While the McCune-Reischauer system of Romanization is followed, it is not followed completely in that it omits the use of the upside down circumflex. This may not be important to most readers, but can cause confusion.
• Described Kim Il Sung as having completed his last two years of education in China (16), when in reality he has also spent most of his early education there as well. My first though was “he didn’t read Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader,” but then on page 21 specifically mentions Dr. Suh as the primary source of information on Kim. It just seems slightly misleading/irritating.
• The early history of Kim Il Sung was covered in far more detail that Syngman Rhee or the transition to Park Chun Hee, which I think is a bit of an omission for a “modern” history.
• The changes in the office of the South Korean presidents are given considerable consideration and detail, while the transition and circumstances of Kim Dae Jung are given relatively little detail: not a balanced presentation.
• Initially about equal description is given to both North and South, but later most of the details and analysis deal directly with North Korea. On the nuclear issue alone, about 100 pages are dedicated. While the information is very interesting and useful, it seems to be a bit of an unbalanced presentation, overall.
• The book was fairly objective, but did present more of the Western point of view. While I agree with most of that (view), I think more NK views or details of NK concerns could have been addressed.
• Many dates are given with out the year. For example, he may be describing events in 1992 through 1995 and listing events in chronological order, but also including information from the past (say 1985, for example), and then continuing with the 1992-1995 chain of events, leading to some confusion and page turning to find out exactly in what year the event occurred.
• Even though the book is revised and updated, it contains only a few pages covering the 1997 financial crisis and the IMF reforms that followed. This is a serious omission of recent history, which the author should have updated.

As a sort of amusing side note, a former South Korean colleague of mine also wrote a review for this book:

Although it is difficult to logically express, clearly there is something that only the Koreans can feel about the relationship between the two Koreas. It originates from the national pride Koreans feel from having had a unified country for more than a millennium, until 1945. Some foreign scholars regard it as a kind of chauvinism or ultra-nationalism, but the foreign specialists in Korean affairs have to understand it in order to make an adequate diplomatic policy toward the two Koreas. It seems, however, that the author failed to express such an understanding for Koreans’ feeling in this book. (emphasis added)

If I had a nickel for every time I heard something like that. . .