Nautilus Analysis: Post-War DPRK Military Fuel Restocking
by Richardson ~ April 27th, 2006. Filed under: DPRK Military, Engagement, Fiskings, North Korea. UPDATE: Peter Hayes provided the following links in comments below:
1.) DPRK Energy Status, Paths, and Options and Nuclear Dismantlement (PPT)
2.) DPRK Briefing Book, with links to, An Estimate of Energy Use in the Armed Forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3.) The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment (PDF)
Original Post: According to Nautilus Institute Director Peter Hayes, it would take the DPRK at least four months to replenish its military fuel supply following a conflict resulting in 30 days of full-time fighting.
There are some apparent flaws in this position, addressed briefly below. From Yonhap:
It would take at least four months for North Korea to be able to restock its military fuels in case of full-time combat, according to … an analysis by Peter Hayes … North Korea would need to double its imports and production to sustain combat.
The study, completed last month, is based on estimates of how much fuel North Korea uses during military exercises, such as jet hours, the number of energy-using vehicles and their fuel use rate… “Based on our estimates of fuel use during exercises, fuel use by DPRK military for 30 days of full-time combat would be up to 200,000 tons,” the study said…
The fuel use figure is based on a wartime scenario in which 50 percent of ground force equipment would be inoperable by the end of 30 days, aircraft cease operations in 24 hours, and 90 percent of naval forces cease operation in five days.
The study predicted it would take four more months to restock military fuel given North Korea’s current supply rate, either by bringing in fuel stored in rear areas or from refining new fuel and then moving it into combat zones.
I have not found the entire report yet, but from what is provided I see at least two issues with this; a) The KPA could obtain fuel, for ground forces in the vicinity at least, in the Seoul metropolitan area, and; b) In the war scenario described, North Korea’s ability to restock is moot; the vast majority of such facilities would no longer exist.
The first point may be taken into consideration in the report - I don’t know, it’s not available, even on the Nautilus site. The second one obviously isn’t, since the use of refining facilities in the analysis would preclude them from being destroyed.
The report seems to have the theoretical and unrealistic assumption that the U.S. would not destroy North Korea’s capacity to obtain and process fuel. Given what is known, I don’t think any credible military analyst would argue that.
What is the motivation for this sort of analysis?
…Hayes argues, pressuring Pyongyang via energy will not be effective. “We provided this analysis … in order to explain to decision-makers that it is very difficult to apply pressure to the DPRK economy or military via energy except during all-out war…”
As long as China and South Korea are appeasing the north, it is true that it is difficult to put much pressure on the regime in that area (but not impossible).
“Therefore, realistic policy options on energy should revolve around cooperative engagement in very specific ways, not more confrontation…” There should be international assistance to stimulate and sustain North Korea’s energy sector and rehabilitate its decaying power grid, estimated to cost between $5.5 billion and $7.5 billion, according to the study. (emphasis added)
So that is the recommendation – a different kind of appeasement. This sort of proposal is only possible if framed in terms of complete and verifiable North Korean nuclear disarmament, which is extremely unlikely to happen voluntarily without either a war or regime collapse. That is, the U.S. won’t give such aid until North Korea gives up all nuclear programs, and North Korea is not about to do that.
The analysis and recommendation – again, as it has been presented by the media, without the benefit of having the full report – appear to be about as useful as a report speculating on real estate prices on Mars over the next ten years.
April 27th, 2006 at 1:52 pm
Blitzkrieg zu Fuß.
April 27th, 2006 at 4:41 pm
More like the Highway of Death.
April 27th, 2006 at 5:28 pm
Dear Richardson, the original study is found on our website at: http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/military/index.html
You are correct in stating that we did not include the DPRK military obtaining fuel supplies from the Seoul area. Anyone who knows the military realities of the Korean Peninsula and US and ROK combined warplanning knows that this will never happen. Any DPRK vehicles that get down the turkey shoot of the various invasion corridors will be as trapped in refugee flows and gridlock as US-ROK vehicles, and won’t be going anywhere, let alone heading for the nearest gas station. Nice image though.
We agree that not allowing for US-ROK rapid demolition of DPRK energy supply systems is unrealistic. But as no-one can estimate the time rate of such demolition, not allowing for it maximizes the available supply to the DPRK that would theoretically be available, and therefore gives the maximum time that one might expect them to operate under combat-driven fuel usage before they run out. It turns out that this number is quite small–roughly a month. That in turn explains partly why DPRK forces are so forward-deployed (apart from threat projection strategic considerations). They will attempt to fight a short war because, apart from anything else, they can’t do otherwise in physical terms.
Finally, I will let you make your own political assertions about appeasement which is simply mud-slinging on your part. But you should consider the strategic realities of trying to use the DPRK energy system as a lever to compel them to comply with their non-nuclear obligations. Because their energy system has largely collapsed, there’s not much leverage to be had, even in peacetime (by wartime, it’s game over and one is no longer seeking to induce behavioral changes).
I hope this helps you to understand our analysis and motivation. The updated study was reported in a presentation at the University of Toronto last month. The powerpoint that led to ROK media coverage was on our front page that week and is now available at:
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0628Hayes.PPT
The updated study will be published in full this summer on our website.
Regards,
Peter Hayes
April 27th, 2006 at 6:41 pm
I’d never imagined any KPA vehicles pulling up to a South Korean gas station (too bad they don’t have the cheer leader-like girls anymore), but was thinking more along the lines of depots. For example, Kimpo would probably be of interest to the North Koreans, if not destroyed by that point.
I have absolutely no doubt that your motivations are nothing but well intentioned, however misguided I believe the recommendations to be. Feel free to label my assertions, “mud-slinging,” but, political correctness aside, they’re more aptly termed, “realistic.” I merely pointed out what I think is an unrealistic assumption followed by equally unrealistic assessments and recommendations, and why, if briefly.
If energy is not a lever, why has China used it in the past? The answer, of course, is that the military by far isn’t the only consumer, and every type of pressure available should be used, anti-counterfeiting and narcotics operations included. Threats do not work, appeasement does not work. Strangulation might, although I don’t necessarily suggest that route.
To date there has been no real engagement with North Korea – the one-sided love affair started by Kim Dae-jung cannot accurately be called engagement, and what it has become under Roh can be seen as nothing but appeasement, which has a proven track record of abject failure.
So how would rebuilding North Korea’s energy infrastructure benefit reunification? It wouldn’t. Anything that prolongs the northern regime – be it Kim or his successor – delays reunification. It is simply another way of prolonging the regime and the suffering of the North Korean people.
Looking forward to the full, updated report.
April 27th, 2006 at 10:49 pm
I beg to differ. While such an estimate is rarely accurate, it can be and has been done.
You are assuming that the non-collapsed portion of the energy system is evenly distributed.
The reality is that the North Korean regime itself considers 2/3 of the population unreliable. Only about 1/3 (which is overrated, in my view) is considered politically loyal.
Pyongyang is populated with such creatures. And Pyongyang is about the only place among the civilian population centers where there is some semblance of energy distribution.
When that remaining center of energy distribution is adversely affected, what do you think will happen to that privileged few who form the cadres of the regime?
Furthermore, there is the non-military role of the DPRK military in peacetime to consider. So far, the military has been one of the primary destinations of energy. Should that be cut off, the chance of “mischief” from the military rises.
While it is true that leverages of various kinds can be overrated, it is also unrealistic to think that any kind of economic or industrial collapse removes leverage completely.
There are always levers, except perhaps in situations of complete chaos.
April 27th, 2006 at 11:41 pm
Dear Richardson,
Thanks for your comments. Two points.
First, re “If energy is not a lever, why has China used it in the past?” The short answer is that China provides oil at friendship prices to the DPRK. When, as usually happens, the DPRK is late paying up, the oil stops flowing. If that happens to coincide with a need to show Washington that Beijing is being tough with Pyongyang, the Chinese are happy to play both sides of the street. That is, I don’t think China has used this lever, despite reports to the contrary in the American media. Moreover, they won’t because the Chinese don’t want the DPRK to collapse or become unstable, given their dependence on South Korean finance, trade and investment in their own transition and thereby, in the stability of the Chinese Communist Party. The question from a policy perspective in Washington is not what the Chinese might do if they were Americans, but what Americans might do to apply leverage…which is the question to which we provide a realistic set of policy options.
Second, re: “So how would rebuilding North Korea’s energy infrastructure benefit reunification” is a big question that has no simple answer—but your sentence imputes to us the view that the DPRK’s energy infrastructure should be rebuilt to benefit reunification. We specifically advocate NOT rebuilding the DPRK’s energy infrastructure now because to do so before there is a full-scale macroeconomic reform and structural adjustment would pre-judge the new industrial geography and energy demand profile of the DPRK, whatever the terms of reunification.
Instead, we have suggested that if an energy package is provided as part of an improbable breakthrough in the nuclear talks, small-scale projects aimed at delivering non-divertible benefits to cold, sick and tired North Koreans are apt and be realized in relation to the short timelines of nuclear dismantlement and nuclear re-certification of the DPRK, whereas big, slow, costly and politically divisive, and symbolic projects orchestrated by governments are not the way to go. If you think that such a breakthrough has zero probability, then you can discount this set of options and worry about other scenarios. Good luck.
With regard to James Na comment, I am not sure what he is arguing. However, it is important to be somewhat realistic in making one’s arguments. He says: “So far, the military has been one of the primary destinations of energy.” This is simply not true.
Even today, the DPRK military are a relatively small fraction of total energy demand, the supply of which is currently dominated by coal and biomass, not refined products. Most of the economy and population, politically reliable or not, are not users of refined product. The elite and the military use the bulk of what refined products are used in the DPRK today. The rest go without. How this translates into leverage before or during a war is obscure to me but James is welcome to his opinion. The elite will always have fuel while they are in charge. If the military don’t have fuel, then they walk. There are plenty of reports of North Korean military walking, using fuelwood to cook with, etc. They have fuel stocked for combat. The rest of the time in this Spartan state, the military can do without like everyone else but the super-elite. Squeezing will not translate into leverage in this context.
Tedious as it may be, may I suggest to readers of this blog that they read the in-depth analysis of the DPRK energy economy at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/energy/DPRK_Energy_2000.pdf
as well as the study on the DPRK military’s energy use that you can also find in the DPRK Briefing Book energy tab. Those in a position to know assure me that it contains better information and analysis than anything used in military planning in the classified world.
Facts that have been ground-truthed as well as checked closely from multiple angles of physical analysis and consistency may be inconvenient, but they help situate one with regard to the true complexity of a dangerous situation.
And as important, if a reader disagrees with our analysis, he or she can change a number, estimate or parameter and recalculate the results as our workbooks are all posted with the reports.
Sincerely,
Peter Hayes
April 28th, 2006 at 8:14 am
Two quick comments:
1. “Appeasement” has a specific dictionary meaning, and I’d argue that giving North Korea a commodity it desperately needs in exchange for concessions that will inevitably prove illusory meets that definition. The negative connotations that historical debate has attached to the word don’t make it mudslinging. We obviously have a different view — that we ought to demand a verifiable and enforceable quo for each quid. At least as I see it, and as I understand Richardson, ensuring the stability of that regime is not such a quo.
2. I’ve been busy with NK Freedom Week, and will ask your indulgence on this question, as I haven’t had time to even read the preliminary report. Will the full report discuss the unknowable factor of North Korea’s stored underground fuel reserves? Have you considered the North’s rumored 20-odd undiscovered tunnels under South Korea, and whether any of them could contain forward-based fuel storage facilities? If those tunnels have concealed entrances in South Korea — and they’d be of little value if they didn’t — they could be restocked commercially from South Korea itself, couldn’t they? Admittedly, that would come at a higher cost, but then again, Kim Jong has a private wave machine in one of his swimming pools.
April 28th, 2006 at 2:21 pm
Do you have any evidence that China didn’t use such a lever? Judging from reports and the circumstances surrounding the incident, it is more likely that it was a (mild) form of punishment, i.e., a lever. To state that in no way implies that China would want to destabilize the DPRK, especially considering the timeframe of the use of the lever.
Well, I obviously disagree that the recommendations are “realistic,” based on the unrealistic assumptions used in the foundation. The impression is that the research was done to justify the desired solution, not identify one based on the evidence.
From slide 24 of your presentation:
That doesn’t sound like waiting for the improbable breakthrough.
I don’t know about it being a “zero” chance, but it is highly unlikely. I also speculated about a breakthrough after the most recent joint statement – with a disclaimer. But it didn’t happen for a reason. We can look at North Korea and say what they should do based on the situation, what would be logical, etc. But that has not been successful.
An agreement and the engagement/interaction/outside information it would likely bring is the problem. The regime is focused on survival, and unfortunately for its people, knowledge of the outside world would completely undermine the legitimacy of the regime by undermining the cult of leadership. That factor is almost always overlooked in analysis. And it precludes a deal under most circumstances.
Leverage against the elite is still a lever, and none the less useful for it. If the elite are unhappy, so much the better. If the military goes another year with degraded training opportunities, so much the better.
That’s an assertion you cannot backup, and I cannot refute, in this forum. If you are speaking about how much fuel X tanks and Y ships will use in Z days, perhaps, and perhaps not. Aside from that, the above assertion is false.
May 4th, 2006 at 6:23 pm
Dear Richardson, you misread the powerpoint presentation. The set of realistic options that are presented, which includes only refurbishing those parts of the already broken grid that make economic sense from the viewpoint of end-use demand and productivity, are options to be implemented AFTER the posited (low probability) breakthrough in nuclear talks, to be phased in sequence with dismantlement (1-6 months from breakthrough) and IAEA recertification with regard to safeguards compliance (1-3 years).
Two other factual points. You ask how I know that the Chinese play both sides of the street with regard to their “cutting off” oil flows to North Korea. The answer is that I have been visiting Beijing since 1975, and I know and talk to people who know; I read the newspapers, but I don’t believe anything on North Korea that I read unless I can confirm it independently and rigorously (especially if it’s in the New York Times). We have been monitoring China’s slowdowns and cutoffs of fuel each year for over a decade. The only difference in the instance we are discussing is that pundits in the US speculated in the media that the Chinese were applying pressure at US instigation, which, if you know anything about China’s relations with the United States and North Korea, is…funny. No-one in Washington who reads cable traffic was confident that the Chinese were applying new pressure via oil on the nuclear issue. In fact, most analysts believed that the opposite was the cost–the last thing the Chinese would do would be to send such a crude (forgive the pun) message to the KPA. They have other channels to communicate than oil pipelines to the DPRK military and leadership.
Second, you ask how I know about the relative robustness of our analysis of the DPRK energy sector relative to US military and other agency data. The answer is that a) we do the NK analysis for the relevant agency in the US government, which is a matter of public record; and b) the person in charge of such analysis in USFK told me that this was the case, that is, the horse’s mouth.
As to the rest, I will leave it to readers to judge but urge them to read the reports, get down and dirty with the data, move past the stereotypes.
North Korea is a nightmare in most respects–to my mind, the collective punishment and child corvee labor are amongst the worst–but we also need to deal with it as it is rather than as we sometimes imagine it to be. Sometimes data combined with analysis produces surprising insights that shift how we respond in order to secure our own interests. North Korea is full of such surprises.
Thanks for your web site. I enjoy the vibrant content.
Sincerely,
Peter Hayes
May 4th, 2006 at 7:33 pm
Dr. Hayes writes:
Perhaps this is clearer during a briefing with the accompanying talking points, but as it is, “start rebuilding the T&D system now,” sound just like what it says.
Actually I asked, “Do you have any evidence that China didn’t use such a lever?” And I was referring to the 2003 incident - when China helped block a UNSC resolution, but had also cut the oil supply for three days, (reportedly) to signal displeasure - not the U.S. request in 2005 for China to withhold oil from Pyongyang. Others have different takes.
I don’t see a contradiction in that; China, like North Korea, prefers the status quo to any of the likely, less palatable outcomes. Blocking international action while (semi) privately and rather mildly smacking Kim’s arse is in my opinion typical of their relationship; sent the message while saving face. And I don’t see China’s withholding oil as a lever to force North Korea to give up nukes, rather more to strongly suggest less outrageous behaviour from Pyongyang – but a lever nonetheless. I think we all agree that China has a limit to how far it will use any lever with North Korea, with stability the guiding factor.
Referring to the bold text, I disagree. As I wrote previously, this is not the place for that discussion.