Recently I wrote of “Russia’s Foolish Alliance with China,” in which I mentioned Ilan Berman.

Berman has written an article, which explains — much more eruditely than I can — of what I call Russia’s foolish alliance with Iran. I share many of its analyses and points. Some choice bits follow.

The background:

For more than a decade, concerns over potential Islamic separatism in the “post-Soviet space” and a mutually beneficial arms trade have nurtured and strengthened the strategic ties between Moscow and Tehran. Over time, these contacts have also assumed a distinctly geopolitical dimension, with both countries viewing their partnership at least partially as a hedge against American interests and U.S. policy in the greater Middle East. Today, Russia serves as the Islamic Republic’s chief strategic partner, and a key enabler of its atomic ambitions.

Moscow’s Faustian bargain:

The Russo-Iranian entente traces its roots back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Serious bilateral diplomatic contacts had begun during the mid- to late 1980s, but ties between Moscow and Tehran truly blossomed with the U.S.SR’s demise. The break-up of the Soviet Union unleashed a wave of ethnic and religious separatism in Russia’s turbulent “southern rim”: Central Asia and the Caucasus. Kremlin officials watched this development with deep apprehension, afraid that the emerging extremism could spill over into parts of the Russian Federation. Having seen Iran’s domination of Lebanon in the early 1980s, and its global efforts to “export the revolution” thereafter, they also became justifiably worried about Tehran taking on a similar role on their periphery.

The resulting deal struck between Moscow and Tehran included a pledge of Russian sales of conventional arms (and later the sharing of nuclear know-how) to Iran in exchange for a tacit understanding that Tehran would steer clear of meddling in the Near Abroad. Iran was eager to comply; still struggling to reconstitute its regional standing and military might in the aftermath of its costly eight-year war with Iraq, the Iranian regime rightly saw Russia as a major potential arms supplier.

The Russo-Iranian entente may have begun as a marriage of convenience, but by the late 1990s it had become much more. [snip]

The strategic partnership nurtured under Primakov took on a new dimension in the last days of 1999, with Vladimir Putin’s assumption of the Russian presidency. Far from breaking with his predecessor’s embrace of the ayatollahs, Putin actually strengthened the Kremlin’s tilt toward Tehran. In November 2000, in a public show of support for the Iranian regime, Russia officially abrogated the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, under which Moscow had agreed to curtail new nuclear-related exports to the Islamic Republic.

Post 9/11 atomic cooperation:

Russian officials, for their part, have taken pains to support Iran’s chief strategic priority: its atomic drive. In October 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid a high-profile visit to Tehran, where he met with his counterpart, Kamal Kharrazi, and with Hassan Rowhani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The meetings yielded mutual affirmations of the strong strategic bonds between Russia and Iran, and an important symbolic message from the Kremlin—support of Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear technology.5 Since then, Russian dignitaries like Federal Atomic Agency Director Aleksandr Rumyantsev and Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov have visited Tehran to confirm their country’s commitment to ongoing atomic cooperation—and to a coordinated approach between the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic to “peace and security” in the Middle East.6

Possible opening for the U.S.:

For, though it is still publicly committed to its long-running partnership with Iran, the Kremlin appears to be waking up to a set of alarming new strategic realities. [snip]

The active proliferation of WMD-related technologies and know-how from Russia to Iran over the past decade has been driven in large part by the Russian notion that such activity was essentially a cost-free exercise. This is no longer the case; Tehran’s substantial investments in its strategic arsenal over the past several years have dramatically expanded the threat the Islamic Republic now poses to Russia. As long ago as 2003, for example, Moscow’s prestigious PIR Centre, a leading nonproliferation think tank, was estimating that by the middle of this year some 20 million ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine could be at risk from a potential Iranian nuclear strike.7

Russian politicians are beginning to grasp this reality. High-profile policymakers like Andrei Kokoshin, the influential chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Defense Committee (and a former Russian National Security Advisor), now speak publicly about the Iranian threat to Russia’s security.8 And, while strategic cooperation has continued, there are encouraging signs that Russia’s contributions to its partnership with Iran have become more cautious. [snip]

Back then, Moscow moved quickly—and successfully—to secure Tehran’s good behavior in exchange for arms and nuclear assistance. But the Russo-Iranian understanding over the “post-Soviet space” could soon become a thing of the past.

For one thing, telltale signs indicate that Iran is expanding its involvement in the spread of radical Islam in the region. In the first part of 2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) uncovered new intelligence indicating that elements of Iran’s clerical army, the Pasdaran, were secretly providing training and logistical support for insurgents from the radical al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).10 Iran is likewise suspected of sponsoring the rise of radical religious and separatist movements in neighboring Azerbaijan over the past several years, and of using them as a means to destabilize and pressure the Aliyev dynasty in Baku.11 This troublemaking has led Russian media outlets to openly question the prudence of continued strategic alignment with Iran.12

For another, Iran remains a serious potential threat to stability in the Caucasus. Officials in Moscow understand full well that, despite Iran’s historic abstention from sponsoring separatism in the “post-Soviet space,” Tehran in the future could use support for Chechen insurgents (or other regional radicals) as a blackmail tool against Moscow if it feels threatened by Russia’s strides toward the West, or as a means to blunt international pressure over its nuclear program. Indeed, signs of such activity are already becoming visible; in a November 2005 exposé, London’s influential Sunday Telegraph reported that the Pasdaran has begun “secretly training Chechen rebels in sophisticated terror techniques to enable them to carry out more effective attacks against Russian forces.”13

Will Russia finally wake up? The conclusion, which I heartily recommend:

Ultimately, however, only Russia can decide whether it values true cooperation with the United States more than its strategic ties to Iran’s ayatollahs. Washington’s role should simply be to make clear that the Kremlin cannot have both—and to provide it with the incentives necessary to make the correct choice.