Assessing North Korea’s Threat, Part 1
by James Na ~ March 9th, 2006. Filed under: Anti-Americanism, DPRK Military, Geopolitics, U.S. Military, U.S.-Korea Relations, WMD, Washington Views.[Part 2 is here.]
Recently at a small dinner gathering, a guest with close ties to the highest level of the Bush administration made some comments regarding the threat North Korea poses to the South.
Citing a poll, he stated that, despite the apparent manifestation of anti-Americanism in South Korea, most South Koreans want the USFK to stay, because they knew that North Korea would invade and takeover the South if the USFK were to leave.
This is inconsistent with my view of the military balance of power between the North and the South. My view has been that South Koreans (especially the elites) want the USFK to stay, because without its presence, they would have to spend considerably more on defense than otherwise (and not just against the North, for that matter).
The Administration insider/adviser countered that South Korea lacks long-range bombers, and that we, the U.S., control munitions supplied to South Korea tightly, making it incapable of defending itself alone against a North Korean invasion.
This is an outdated view of South Korea’s military-industrial complex in my estimation. I believe that South Korea by itself has both the conventional military force and the military industrial capability to successfully defeat any North Korean invasion. Just about the only thing the South Korean forces would need from the U.S. would be early warning capability, a deficiency (or “reliance on another”) I expect them to remedy in the near future.
Similarly, another expert, Andrei Lankov, recently penned an op-ed about North Korea’s reserve forces that portrays them in a rather impressive light, largely based on numbers (it’s a well known saying, at times attributed to Stalin, that “quantity has a quality all to its own”).
While I am not given to over-rating South Korea’s increasingly technologically advanced, but still largely conscript force, I am also not given to over-rating North Korea’s obsolete military either (the best and easily accessible open sources for North Korea’s military are: Joseph S. Bermudez’s “The Armed Forces of North Korea” — grab it while you can, it comes and goes out of stock — and Globalsecurity.org).
From these open sources, it becomes clear that North Korea made costly investments in mechanization/motorization of its dominant ground forces in the 1970’s-1990’s. But as Nazi Germany found out as World War II wore on, mechanization can be counter-productive when the thusly mechanized force cannot be adequately supplied (in fact, the Wehrmacht was de-mechanizing by the end of the war due to severe material shortages).
In North Korea’s case, my view is that its ability to sustain an armored/mechanized thrust into the traditional invasion corridors is exceptionally strained at best. Any such move is likely to make 73 Easting look like a mere skirmish, and would resemble an Asian version of the Highway of Death.
That leaves two other potent North Korean traditional force elements that can threaten the South: the large artillery force aimed at Seoul and the special operations units (often said to be 100,000 strong).
It is true that a sustained artillery barrage could wreak havoc on the metropolis that is Seoul. But this is proverbially a single-shot weapon, especially one without assuredly catastrophic effect. Furthermore, much of this aging, but hardened/fortified force is not particularly helpful in the event of an invasion into North Korea from another direction. In other words, it is not a weapon that can be relied upon to preserve the regime (more on this below).
North Korea’s special operations forces are reputedly the best trained, motivated and politically reliable among its military forces. With their reputed size and proven ability to meld into, and confound, South Korea’s civil/rear area defense forces, they have a great ability to disturb South Korea by widespread acts of assassination, sabotage and disruption.
But they are not a force that can single-handedly takeover the South. Such an attempt would inflict a great cost on the South, but would be defeated in the end. Indeed, their greatest contribution would be to create confusion in the rear while there is an on-going armored invasion through the front. But as I elaborated earlier, such an invasion is doomed to a bloody end.
In addition, as they are reputedly the politically most reliable force, North Korean elites that are obsessed about regime preservation (but quite clever in balance of power arithmetic) would be unlikely to gamble away such a force.
This leaves NBC weapons, particularly nuclear ones. More on this in Part 2.
March 9th, 2006 at 3:31 am
Your comments are all well-taken, but isn’t the issue the will of the ROK to resist?
March 9th, 2006 at 6:58 am
Another military strength of North Korea is its alliance with China. Therefore, it’s important for South Korea to have its own alliance with America. The South Korean military is very capable, but it is no match for a combined China and North Korea.
March 9th, 2006 at 7:14 am
One important issue in reunification is the integration of the military from both Koreas. It will be interesting to see how well the soldiers can get along with each other. I’m optimistic that it can work, especially after seeing how Olympic athletes from both countries joined together in one team.
March 9th, 2006 at 7:28 am
The Olympic marches were a phony, photo-op event held twice in 4 years. It might be more relevant to see IF the Koreas actually field the unified team they’ve agreed to run in 2008.
It is wrong to expect a friendly merger of the two Koreas, let alone of their armies. Unification on North Korean terms can only happen through war and victory by the KPA. The only internationally, morally and politically acceptable scenario will be South Korean-led unification and the end of North Korea. The Sunshine Policy unfortunately seems to be making this less and less likely.
March 9th, 2006 at 7:44 am
It’s more than a little disconcerting what some in high levels of government believe (e.g., despite the polls…) on this issue. I think that South Korean’s have a variety of reasons to want USFK to remain; (a) the possibility, however unlikely, that North Korea might attack if the U.S. left; (b) the cost benefit, and; (c) less worry about a threat from China and/or Japan while U.S. troops remain in South Korea.
Per the comments of Gen. Bell to the Senate, it is evidentially the position of USFK that North Korea still intends to reunify the peninsula under its system, which I find to be ludicrous. If the regime is so focused on regime survival (and it is), and strives to keep its population isolated from conflicting information, how on earth would the control the flow of information from a newly captive 45+ million South Koreans? I suppose USFK must retain that assessment for relevance, but it’s completely counter to what most civilian analysts hold to be true.
Note to Mi-Hwa – the NK/PRC alliance does not (any longer) extend to a NK invasion of the south; it is only in the event that NK is itself invaded.
March 9th, 2006 at 12:08 pm
Lets zoom out alittle bit and focus on American strategery in East Asia and see where South Korea fits in. America and China are engaged in a contest for Asia over the next 10 years. America is working to contain China with a string of military and economic alliances from Russia to the Persian Gulf. We’ve collected Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and various Persian Gulf countries to our way of thinking. India and Indoenesia are still the big prize left to woo but India is definitely trying on wedding gowns made in the US of A. China has captured Burma, Pakistan, North Korea firmly in its camp. Even accounting for left overs, such as Vietnam, Thailand, etc, the US has an overwhelming edge of influence and power. So China must chip away at that edge if she is to dominate Asia. I think South Korea is the weakest link in our chain of alliances and its not North Korea that is the danger, she is nothing but a proxy or Trojan Horse for China as she tries to weaken the US position. Taking South Korea from a firm alliance member into neutrality threatens Japan too and helps intimidate them. Taiwan is fast becoming neutralized anyway as its economy integrates with the vastly larger mainland and its politics fractures between pro-Beijing and nationalist parties. South Korea then is a key to unlocking American influence from East Asia. Remember that old saw “Be careful what you wish for”.
March 9th, 2006 at 2:00 pm
Hopefully the NBC segment of your assessment will consider the effect on the inter-Korean balance of power of US departure from ROK with the NK’s having a nuclear weapon and the ROK’s, or Japan, so far as is known, not having such weapons. Even with American forces in Japan, the absence of a nuclear deterrent on the south side of the DMZ could be cause for some concern.
March 10th, 2006 at 7:40 am
I think the orignial post could use more on the idea of a deterent force.
NK’s chances to successfully take over the South by military might are small, but does it know that? I think in the back of their minds, that is what South Korean’s who point to the NK threat as continuing justification for USFK think. Will NK respect the South’s force as a deterent or miscaculate?
Also, these Korean elite want USFK for finacial reasons like others have noted.
If SK wanted to, it could adjust its strength into making a big enough deterent force — if it wanted to….
It does not except for some in Roh’s inner circle.
On the hem China in idea, I think it is as overblown as the idea the South can’t defend itself.
South Korea is not and will not be a place useful for facing off China even if the US wants to. SK will fight to remain neutral whether the US-SK alliance survives or not.
Also, if the US planners have as a central driving force the desire to hem in the China threat, I think they are very wrong headed. It is something to consider and plan for, but it should not be the primary concern.
To become a major threat, China will have to fullfill its potential.
To fullfill its potential, it will need to work more and more with the rest of the world, not against it.
It makes no overall sense for the US or Japan to seek to treat China like an enemy or such a big potenial enemy, it must be worked against today.
And even if China became an enemy, what good would US troops really do in Korea? Would it scare China? Would it make China more vulnerable or the US or both? Does the US want to plan for a ground war against China via Korea or anywhere else? Isn’t Japan, an island nation, a better place for a line of defense?
March 13th, 2006 at 2:47 am
Assessing North Korea’s Threat, Part 1
Assessing North Korea’s Threat, Part 1
Assessing North Korea’s Threat, Part 1
[…] Part 1 is found here. […]