North Korea’s Ballistic & Cruise Missiles
by Richardson ~ March 8th, 2006. Filed under: Axis of Evil, DPRK Military, North Korea, WMD.The new commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), Gen. B.B. Bell, recently briefed the Senate Armed Services Committee on developments with North Korea’s ballistic missile program (Reuters):
North Korea is set to deploy ballistic missiles that could reach Alaska and remains a global security threat despite its failing economy. . . “Reports indicate North Korea is also preparing to field a new intermediate range ballistic missile which could easily reach United States facilities in Okinawa, Guam, and possibly Alaska . . .”
North Korea is working on a three-stage version of its long-range Taepo Dong missile, which could be operational in the next decade and would enable the country “to directly target the continental United States,” Bell said.
The Chosun Ilbo has a related article:
A high ranking government source said Tuesday that, “North Korea is in the middle of building two underground missile sites in Yangdok County, South Pyongan Province and Sangnam-ni, Hochon County, North Hamgyeong Province. Construction is about 70 to 80 percent complete . . . In particular, U.S. spy satellites have discovered about 10 of the newly designed IRBMs and mobile launchers at the two sites between last year and the beginning of this year… We presume these bases to be for a new kind of ballistic missile, not Rodong 1’s or Scud’s. . .” (emphasis added)
The new missile, unlike the Taepodong 1 that is launched from a fixed site, is loaded onto a mobile missile launch vehicle. It is, therefore, highly mobile.
Yonhap downplayed Gen. Bell’s message with a short, two paragraph article that does not appear to be contextually consistent with the overall message from the general:
But what used to be an active program in the communist nation to develop inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) appears to have tapered off over the last several years. . . [said Gen. Bell].
The three-stage Taepodong under development Gen. Bell refers of is the Taepodong-2 (an ICBM, a.k.a. Nodong 4 and NKSL-X-2). The Taepodong-1 (an MRBM) was the two-stage type lobbed over Japan on 31 August 1998.
It is not surprising that North Korea continues to develop mobile missile launch capabilities; in the event of a conflict, fixed sites are likely to be destroyed quickly, while transporter erector launchers (TEL) have the advantage of being hidden almost anywhere.
It is perhaps more likely that North Korea would launch a missile attach on the U.S. with ship-based ballistic missiles than from either fixed missile facilities or mobile TEL in North Korea, as it would instantly obvious if the attach came from the Korean Peninsula.
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Overview
Ballistic missiles (BM) differ from cruise missiles (CM) in that they are basically rockets, with one or more stages, that typically attain a high altitude before descending on the target. Generally inertial guidance systems are employed, and although the course can be adjusted somewhat during flight, significant changes cannot be made. BM are categorized by maximum range as SRMB, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM (see table below). BM have a reentry vehicle (RV) that carries a conventional or nuclear warhead, and some BM have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), that carry up to ten warheads. They use either solid or liquid propellant (hybrid propellants are for the most part experimental at this point), and different stages may use different propellants.
Cruise missiles are usually propelled by small jet engines and are comparable to unmanned aircraft. They are categorized by mission and launch mode, and most are classified as land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) and anti-ship (or sub) cruise missiles (ASCM). The flight path of a CM is mostly level, as opposed to the arched trajectory of a BM, and it flies to a pre-determined target with a much greater degree of accuracy than BM. CM use an inertial navigation system and may be further guided by a radar-based systems, including but not limited to the Global Positioning System (GPS), and the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).

North Korea’s Missiles (info from GlobalSecurity.Org)
Information on DPRK missiles is generally incomplete and inconsistent. North Korea has made many modifications to missiles and missiles designs acquired from the former Soviet Union, making accurate stage and range assessments difficult.
| Designation | Stages | Engine | Range | Category | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KN-01 | 1 | turbojet | 110 km | ASCM | SS-N-1 Styx |
| KN-2 | 1 | solid | 110 km | SRBM | SS-21 Scarab |
| Hwasong 5 / Scud-B | 1 | liquid | 300-330 km | SRBM | |
| Hwasong 6 / Scud-C | 1 | liquid | 500 km | SRBM | Scud-C |
| No-dong-1, 2 | 1 | liquid | 1,300 km | MRBM | SS-N-5 |
| No-dong-B | 1 | liquid | 2750 - 4000 km | IRBM | SS-N-6 |
| Taep’o-dong-1 | 2 | liquid | 2000 - 2900 km | IRBM | [Nodong 3] |
| Taep’o-dong-2 | 2 | liquid | 3750 - 15,000 km | ICBM | [Nodong 4] |
Missile Resources
GlobalSecurity.Org: North Korea Special Weapons - WMD
GlobalSecurity.Org: Missile Proliferation Summary
FAS: North Korea Special Weapons - Missiles
FAS: Ballistic Missiles
CNS: North Korean Cruise Missile Tests–and Iraqi Cruise Missile Attacks–Raise Troubling Questions for Missile Defenses
CDI: North Korea’s Missile Flight Tests
NTI: North Korea Profile - Missile Overview
Arms Control: Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories
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March 10th, 2006 at 7:43 am
A 2006 prediction —-
look for another 1998 ICBM test.
July 16th, 2006 at 3:33 pm
I’d like to point out the March prediction by Usinkorea of an ICBM test this year.
July 16th, 2006 at 5:41 pm
Yippie!!!
Thanks for the plug.
You might remember me saying, back a few years ago when they tried to harass a US spyplane in int airspace (not a U2) - to copycat in a way what happened with China not long before that, —-
that I thought it was a weak provocation by the North’s standards and the fact they didn’t do something like shoot up an ICBM showed the North understood its limits. (How it couldn’t afford to piss off China at the time).
My latest prediction, now that the ICBM test has both failed to gain them concessions —- or force China to cut it off
expect a nuclear bomb underground test within the next 5 years……
If the US lifts sanctions on the banking and such, I remove the prediction.
If things remain pretty much as they are or the US adds other biting sanctions
I believe there is a 80% chance a nuke explosion will be used — to test their nuke design —- but also to increase the level of provocation to something that works.
October 26th, 2006 at 10:50 am
holy crap. usinkorea, what else do you see in your crystal ball? I think i read you talking about collapse of DRPK real soon. I believe you.
October 26th, 2006 at 9:35 pm
I wouldn’t call it a crystal ball - it is much more like licking my finger and sticking up into the wind - or like trying to imagine what happens when you pull this or that string in the Gordian Knot.
I think the way in which the nuke test came so close after the ICBM test - without NK milking the threat of a test for a good amount of time - something NK is usually fairly good at doing —– it means Pyongyang is feeling a sense of desperation.
Then, when I look around at some other strings that have been going “twang” over the last 12 months or so - I see more reason to believe maybe NK is ready to take a run toward collapse —— and I’ve never predicted or put much stock at all whenever collapse has been predicted in the press or think-tanks before.
China has made some moves that should significantly increase pressure on NK (unless China has arranged backdoor ways to make up for the appearance of pressure — and I see no reason to believe China is pretending). And China is the key to NK’s survival.
Given China’s moves on the banking front and others - like not moving in the opposite direction ——- which would be giving NK MORE help to counter-balance the US significant sanctions on the money flow ———- and the fact Pyongyang seems to be getting despearte —-
—– I place new weight on the fact China has been moving troops near the border, building a fence, claiming Parhae and Korguryo history, and having some infrequent shoot outs with North Koreans on the border - and then NK keeping those Chinese trains that brought in goods —
Then, elsewhere, the fact NK has uped the stakes a good bit with a nuke test —– it has gained much more attention from the kind of people who would seriously think about taking NK down - one way or another.
Add to that this dirty bomb nuke material some Koreans in China got caught trying to sell and what the news is saying about that —
There is an increasing chance NK might turn its internal propaganda into self-fulfilling prophesy by convincing the US the regime has to go and soon.
Start seeing how all these many things - some very big, some very small - and to me ——-
—-it adds up to North Korea not living to see 2009.
And two fundamental reasons why:
I don’t see the US backing down.
I don’t see NK backing down.
(and 3 - NK has now made it kind of too difficult for China to back down. Once China gets on board with the UN and US as it has been the last 6 months to a year — it isn’t so easy to disengage and reverse course toward giving NK pretty much unconditional support just to save the regime)