I attended a Heritage Foundation event titled “China’s North Korea Conundrum” today. The speakers were:

Bonnie Glaser, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies;
John Tkacik, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation; and
Gordon Chang, Author of Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World (see a related Korea Liberator entry here).

You can view the video of the whole event here, but below is a summary for those who don’t wish to spend 90 minutes staring into a tiny computer screen:

Glaser’s view is that the Chinese priority regarding North Korea is to preserve stability, and to prevent an outside major power from dominating the entire Korean Peninsula. She is also of the view that China wants to exert influence over the Peninsula, but “not dominate it,” and sees South Korean economic investments in China as being important for Chinese development, especially in its northeastern “rust belt.”

She further believes that the current Chinese leaders want North Korea to reform economically and “wean away” from Chinese subsidies.

Glaser thinks that while the first-generation Chinese leaders saw North Korea as a buffer state, the current leaders may not and thinks that they are not opposed to the re-unification of the two Koreas under Southern leadership. In fact, she believes that China is confident of its relationship with South Korea and thinks (hopefully) that a unified Korea will be unaligned and neutral, and possibly serve as a bulwark against Japan (caveat: she think that there may be some territorial friction between China and a unified Korea, but that these will be minor).

Tkacik made a bold statement that there is no historical evidence that the Chinese ever considered North Korea a buffer state. He thinks that there are some distrust between the PLA and the KPA despite historical ties. (He admitted that, until recently, he was not aware of the fact that many early KPA members were former soldiers of PLA campaigns!)

He thinks that the PLA considers North Korea unstable, a disaster waiting to happen and is preparing actively for such a contingency, and alluded that the recent joint Sino-Russian “Peace Mission 2005″ military exercise in Shandong was just such a preparation for takeover of North Korea (in case it imploded). He also mentioned the river crossing exercise on the Yalu the PLA conducted as further evidence.

Additionally, Tkacik made a comment that North Korea seemed “complacent” about the Goguryeo controversy (which made Glaser shaker her head in disagreement).

Chang stated that it was a Maoist goal to proliferate nuclear weapons once China acquired the capability, but that it became somewhat more conservative when it actually did get the bomb. Nonetheless, he believes that China is responsible for much proliferation.

He believes that the Pakistani-North Korean nuclear agreement could not have taken place without Chinese knowledge or even “direction.” He further linked China to the Iranian nuclear program. He cited these as reasons why China is not yet ready for the “Great Power role.”

On North Korea, he thinks that South Korean government’s appeasement gave cover for China to act “irresponsibly.”

Chang thinks that American “inaction” led to Chinese misbehavior on proliferation issues. According to Chang, the U.S. always criticized China for infringing on American interests, but never took action to “punish” it and make China “pay for it” — and, in fact, further rewarded China (tried to buy good behavior).

He thinks it is now time for a comprehensive review of America’s China policy. Because he believes that proliferation is the greatest threat facing the United States today, the U.S. must use the North Korean nuclear program as the litmus test for China. Furthermore, he is of the view that the U.S. must actively use its leverage on China, namely, the access to American capital and markets that made China’s economic development possible.

Chang thinks that exercising this “punishment” may be necessary even if it created a deep recession in the U.S. (”empty Wal-Mart shelves”), because preventing proliferation is a redline American security interest.

I asked Bonnie Glaser whether a change in South Korea government (to a conservative one) next year and on would alter Chinese confidence or calculation in a unified Korea being “neutral.” She agreed, yes, in the end, but thought that it was unlikely given that the Chinese view of what’s happened in South Korea for the past ten years is that it is a fundamental political shift.

In an amusing note, Chris Nelson was also in attendance. He asked a question and introduced himself as “Chris Nelson, of the Chris Nelson Report,” which led Gordon Chang to address him back somewhat sarcastically “Okay, Chris Nelson, of the Chris Nelson Report…”