During defense working-level meetings in 2002, made public on Wednesday, the U.S. and South Korea drafted – “but failed to adopt” – a joint statement dealing with the future of the Korean Peninsula, agreeing that U.S. forces would remain in Korea even after reunification.

Equally, if not more, important is that the joint statement made the assumption that North Korea would eventually collapse and be absorbed by South Korea. This runs counter to officially stated ROK policy on reunification, and did at the time as well.

From Yonhap:

The United States has endorsed South Korea-led unification of the Korean Peninsula and agreed to maintain its troops here afterward, according to a draft defense document revealed Wednesday

[…]

According to the document, the two sides agreed on a three-stage unification: reconciliation and cooperation, peaceful coexistence and eventual unification, rather than an inter-Korean confederation in between.

The concept of confederation promoted by South Korea has been at odds with that of North Korea, which pushes for a federation as a way of unifying the two Koreas after more than half a century of division.

During their historic summit in 2000, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il agreed on a loose form of confederation or federation, leaving much room for interpretation in its implementation.

[…]

At the stage of eventual unification, South Korea is to take an active security role on the Korean Peninsula on the assumption that the communist regime will collapse. An influx of North Korean refugees into South Korea may cause chaos on the peninsula, according to the document.

Progressive civic activists, however, derided the draft report, saying it runs counter to the principle of the joint declaration made during the summit of the two leaders in June 2000. (emphasis added)

Some points to take away from this. First, as late as 2002 the ROK government acknowledged that a U.S. troop presence in even a unified Korea will be needed. Second, the decades-old ROK formula for reunification is given preference over the DPRK federation, although the third item of note – the fundamental assumption the northern regime will collapse – renders both the three-stage plan and the federation approach rather unlikely for planning purposes. In a rare glimmer of realism in South Korean policy related to the future of North Korea, it also runs completely counter to the Roh administrations current policy based upon Kim Dae-jung’s, “Sunshine Policy.”

The recently released draft of the joint statement probably does not give great detail on either sides reasoning for keeping American forces in Korea after reunification for political reasons. Fortunately, I do not have the same constraint when explaining why the U.S. will remain in Korea (and Japan), reunified or not, for the foreseeable future:

… some Korean and U.S. policy makers realize that an East Asian arms race scenario just as much a threat today as during the Cold War.

It goes like this; The U.S. pulls out of Korea, for whatever reason. South Korea predictably feels the need to beef up its security due to the absence of U.S. troops, although more from the (real or perceived) threat from Japan rather than North Korea. South Korea is also worried about Chinese designs on North Korean territory. Japan must respond to the Korean buildup, and so enhances its forces with some projection capability, which it currently lacks. This in turn causes concern in China, where Japan is viewed as a threat, although Korea is not. At some point, either Korea or Japan may consider the nuclear option, since it is too costly for them to spend scarce resources on a massive conventional build-up of equipment and forces. The other would soon follow, and East Asia would be a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Tokdo/Takeshima dispute.

While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in a number of ways, the overall outcome would complicate security and economic matters in East Asia even without the conflict that would probably become a world war. As long as policy makers don’t forget this, the U.S. will be in Korea and Japan

H/T, From the Nakdong to the Yalu (formerly the Marmot)
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