Korean Reunification – Who wants it?
by Richardson ~ January 31st, 2006. Filed under: America, China, Engagement, Japan, North Korea, Six-Party Talks.
This is not a current topic in the news, or something on the surface related directly to the Six-Party Talks, but being reminded of the fact that none of the nations involved in the talks want Korean reunification any time soon can be useful in understanding the big picture. Reunification is certainly considered in Pyongyang’s calculus, and is fundamental to why the regime prefers brinksmanship over peaceful coexistence, and will continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Something to keep in mind as talks continue to fail.
NORTH KOREA: While reunification has been a part of North Korea’s official ideology since its creation in 1948, the regime has not realistically consider the possibility of actually doing so for the past two decades. Remembering that regime survivability is priory number one for Kim Jong-il, consider the hypothetical that the Korean Peninsula becomes reunified under North Korean rule. This Northern-System-Prevailed scenario assumes a drastic change in the south which would make it possible for North Korea to absorb the south. Repercussions of the cult regime and style of government would cause such widespread discontent in both northern and southern populations it would virtually guarantee the destabilization and collapse of the ruling regime, be that Kim Jong-il or his successor.
Upon being exposed to those from the south, those in the north would soon realize that their ideology and entire modern history are based upon mythology, carefully crafted by masters of propaganda to incorporate them into what is likely the most controlling cult regime the world has ever seen. This is also the reason for the regimes continuing self-isolation. Even if the regime attempted to keep the two Koreas separate for rule, the information would eventually spread. Separate rule would pose its own problems, and it is doubtful that the Korean people would have the patience to accept such an arrangement after over half a century of separation.
Although many South Koreans hold strong (and rather illogical) anti-American views, it is still a far cry from accepting what the north would have to offer by way of social systems (e.g., political, educational, etc.). Those in the south would soon be disillusioned by the reality of the situation, which at a minimum would have to include stricter social and political controls than the saw even at the height of the military dictatorships in the south, and a severe financial drain as the north siphoned off revenue from the south.
The current DPRK-induced tension of nuclear proliferation is exactly what Kim Jong-il and the rest of North Korea’s leadership desires (PDF). They use security concerns to convince their population that the sacrifices they make are for the survival of the country, when in reality it is the survival of the regime that is paramount. This is also why North Korea maintains an ambiguous nuclear status – they claim they have them, but we cannot say for certain without proof, which North Korea refuses to provide. Due to the size and positioning of its conventional forces, including artillery aimed at Seoul, and with the U.S. being embroiled in Iraq at the moment, North Korea has little to fear from a U.S. invasion (the U.S. still considers the destruction of Seoul too high a price to pay, for now).
With virtually strings free aid from South Korea and an invasion by U.S. forces highly unlikely, North Korea has every reason to pursue nuclear weapons and avoid any actions that might lead to reunification. This is their strategy of surviving for the long-term.
SOUTH KOREA: South Koreans do want reunification – just not yet. When? When the cost, estimated in 2000 to be US$2-3 trillion (PDF), will be less. Lessons from the study of German reunification have made a hasty reunification undesirable. For example, East and West Germans were relatively close to one another in terms of income, but not the case for the two Koreas:
South Korea has a population of 48.6 million with an annual income of $19,200 per capita. North Korea has about 23 million people with a per capita income of $1,400. Were the two countries to reunify, the resulting country would have a combined population of over 70 million, but with an average per capita income of about $13,500. That is, in some sense the cost of reunification to South Koreans could be a one-third reduction in annual income. (emphasis added)
Even the billions that could be saved annually in defense costs would be a mere drop in the bucket compared to the overall costs. South Koreans have become accustomed to a relative affluence, and that lifestyle would become a thing of the past after reunification. While many, perhaps the vast majority, profess a desire to reunify, many do not want to pay the price in reality.
Another factor to consider in the let’s-reunify-later stance in South Korea is the skill and education level of North Koreans. Defectors from North Korean now living in the south face difficulty finding suitable work, and often feel discriminated against (to be fair, probably due to both being relatively unskilled/educated, and the undeniable prejudices that exist in South Korea). This would lead to a myriad of social problems and unrest, and add even more to the overall costs (although single North Korean women would be more than welcomed in the south).
South Korea’s policy of engagement with the north, formerly called the “Sunshine Policy,” is partially meant to help bring North Korea up to a similar standard of living as the south, which would theoretically make for a less difficult reunification. The problem is that being on par with the south would not be an inducement for the north to want to reunify, in fact the north has historically been even more competitive for social-political leadership when they were economic equals.
The “hard landing” option is outright rejected, while the “soft landing” is something of a utopian fantasy, at least with the current northern leadership. In the end, South Korea’s policy of seeking reunification later amounts to no reunification.
CHINA: To put it bluntly, China prefers a divided Korea since a unified peninsula would bring the possibility of having a nation with U.S. forces (and with a new number one priority in the region – China) on its border, and open up territorial issues:
Officially, China supports Korean unification as long as this occurs peacefully and through the efforts of the Korean people themselves. Outside analysts, however, have questioned the sincerity of this position. To publicly oppose reunification would offend Koreans on both sides of the 38th Parallel, and a divided Korea has clearly been advantageous in some ways for Beijing. The division has ensured a weak and preoccupied country on one of China’s borders. In contrast, a united Korea would be a stronger state that might turn its attention to unpleasant issues such as Korean interest in incorporating parts of Chinese territory, including Baekdu Mountain and areas of Manchuria with heavily ethnic Korean populations.
Although North Korea’s nuclear brinksmanship has forced China to take a more constructive role in negotiations that it might have otherwise preferred, it has also created an opportunity for China to garner global prestige for its assistance.
Financially China would lose much of a valuable market in South Korea, since the costs of reunification would make Chinese products unattractive to Korean consumers. To compound this, China might face an influx of refugees, and be asked to shoulder some of the costs of reunification.
The status quo is by far preferable to China.
JAPAN: The current threat posed by North Korean missiles and potential nuclear weapons is something Japan would like to see resolved in a peaceful manner, but reunification poses its own risks.
Japan has some of the same financial concerns as China – loss of southern market, costs of reunification, etc. – but traditionally Japan has considered the Korean Peninsula to be a “dagger” pointing at its heart. Indeed, a unified Korea could easily lead to a regional arms race where both Korea and Japan go nuclear, and tensions with China are elevated. In this situation a relatively minor conflict between China-Taiwan, or even between China and Korea, could spark an all out regional war, or even a world war.
A resolution to current security issue with North Korea, but falling short of reunification, is preferable to Japan.
RUSSIA: Like China, Russia does not want to see U.S. forces on its border. Unlike China and Japan, however, Russia would stand to lose little in the way of trade. More importantly for Russia, the status quo provides an opportunity for it to ask as an intermediary, or attempt to, with the goal of regaining lost prominence, at the same time using it as a card to play against the U.S., if and when needed. Russia has little to gain from Korean reunification except potential security headaches.
UNITED STATES: American concerns about Korean reunification are based more on security issues than financial ones. Although a reunified Korea is likely to opt to keep U.S. forces – the U.S. philosophy is that it is much less expensive in terms of lives and money to maintain stabilization forces than to fight a war – the possibility exists that an American military presence would be shunned, which could easily lead to the arms race mentioned above (including a nuclear Korea and Japan), and a general deterioration of regional stability.
Less altruistic concerns might be that the ROK is the sixth largest purchased of U.S. arms, the partial loss of a justification for National Missile Defense (NMD), and of course the issue of cost (e.g., humanitarian aid, infrastructure, etc.).
Ending the North Korean nuclear situation and having troops in a country bordering China and Russia would be a definite plus, but at this point the uncertainty surrounding potential problems outweigh any advantages.
As neutral as the U.S. position might seem to be in terms of benefits, the U.S. is ideologically for reunification. This has led to the odd predicament where all local parties profess to want something that none really do, at least for the foreseeable future, leaving the U.S. as the nation with most positive outlook on near-term reunification.
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February 13th, 2006 at 9:09 pm
You left out one other important reason why no one, least of all the South Koreans, wants unification.
Decades of environmental abuse and chemical dumping by the North Korean regime have created a toxic waste nightmare in the North, similar to what the Russians did in their colonies all over eastern Europe.
The South Koreans know that they will be the ones who have to clean up the mess. Environmental cleanup costs in the former East Germany were one of the major reasons the German economy tanked in the early 1990s, taking the European, US, and Japanese economies down with them for years.
May 1st, 2006 at 9:59 am
I don’t tend to think that is very high on the list of reasons not to reunify.
May 1st, 2006 at 11:14 am
You are correct on your evaluation of NK population and Army being “contaminated” by S Korean ideals if there is reunification under NK system. When the Red Army (USSR) invaded the Baltic States in the early 20th century the Soviet Soldiers were disilusioned when they arrived in the Baltic cities to find out that the Baltic peoples were actually living better than the Soviets. Soviet intelligence had told them otherwise, and many Soviet soldiers deserted and/or joined Baltic partisans. I bet the same would happen to NK Soldiers if and when they set foot in Seoul. Tales of NK refugees that come to the south after getting some exposure to the “truth about the south” abound, the NK govt would have a hard time stying in power once their Army goes south beyond the DMZ.
May 3rd, 2007 at 3:13 am
As a footnote to sanmusa’s comment (only one year and two days later), it’s worth recalling Vladimir Putin’s culture shock when he came to the GDR in ca. 1985. In his “Ot Pervogo Litsa” (”From the First Person”) book he expresses his genuine surprise when encountering the much-higher-than-at-home living standards in Dresden and Leipzig, putting him in the archetypical “that really made me think” position. There are many unknowns in the Korean reunification equation, and one of the biggest is how the DPRK citizens might react (individually and collectively) to the different life-style and affluence of ROK.
May 3rd, 2007 at 12:12 pm
If how refugees who’ve settled in the ROK act is any indication, it’s not going to go very smoothly. They soon realize they’ve little or no job skills and don’t know how to function in a modern society.
May 3rd, 2007 at 7:01 pm
Have the refugees / defectors / emigrators now come in sufficient numbers to form “a group”, in a reasonable sociological sense of the word? Or are they in essence “a string of non-connected individuals”? Are sociologists and psychologists and historians and book-writers and TV people and CIA agents hot on their trails, to interview and analyse and report about “life in NK” and “from workers’ paradise to [insert favourite two-word description here]”? Are there noteworthy socio-indicators of those that somehow manage to leave DPRK (age, work type, poor or not-so-poor, education, skills)? Can they all go teaching juche at the local high schools?
May 3rd, 2007 at 8:45 pm
In 2006 the number of North Korean refugees/defectors to South Korean reached the 10,000 mark, though I’m not sure how many have arrived in so far this year.
I believe that many former North Koreans do form a community of sorts (though not as strong as in their home towns), due to both the shared experiences of living through the famine, the hardships of being refugees, and unpleasant experiences in South Korea, but am not sure how close-knit they are. As a rule, they tend to stay off the radar as their families in North Korea likely would be punished (i.e., sent to the gulags) if it was learned they had defected to the south.
Most of the defectors are from the poorest province in the northeast corner, North Hamgyŏng (함경북도 / 咸鏡北道), and do not have skills above what would be unskilled labor in the south. In fact, on average the education and skill of North Koreans is far below that of South Koreans. Even educated North Koreans are not prepared for a similar level of work in the south.
But no, you won’t find any of them teaching Juch’e in the local schools; most defectors reject the North Korean system. The South Korean Teachers Union, however, seems more inclined to such teachings.
The Daily NK newspaper is a publication of former North Koreans, btw.
May 4th, 2007 at 5:35 am
Thanks for valuable comments and links. The “Above all, most miss the strong sense of community they experienced in the North” and “In the North, your neighbor’s house is like your own” remarks are crucial ones and ought to be met with respect, compassion, and a better and more genuinely helpful programme of naturalisation.
Could you also comment on the following, taken from the Korean Friendship Association’s (officially approved) DPRK FAQ pages? To what extent is the “full freedom of travel” a blatant lie, on the 0-100 scale? Are tourist excursions to China ever taking place, for example?
“15. Can North Koreans travel abroad?
In spite of accusations to the contrary, North Koreans enjoy the full freedom of travel. Many DPRK citizens travel abroad for scientific research, education, language training, religious conferences and trade fairs, for example. There are also hundreds of thousands of DPRK citizens living abroad, in China and Japan, for example.”
May 4th, 2007 at 1:01 pm
I’d say that on a scale of 0-100 (0 being absolute truth and 100 being an absolute lie), the statement that, “North Koreans enjoy the full freedom of travel,” is about a 500.
Not only can average North Koreans not travel abroad, they are not supposed to travel within North Korea without special passes (like most restrictions in North Korea, bribes can fix that, for domestic travel). Furthermore, the mere act of leaving the country is legally enough, in the DPRK, to be executed:
They do attempt to sweeten the lie with a few grains of truth. Some North Koreans do indeed travel internationally, though it would still be a stretch to call it the “full freedom of travel.” These are diplomats, business men, intelligence officers, and yes, even some genuine students. What they left out is that should these travelers break some rule, their families could end up dead or in concentration camps (perhaps worse than dead).
And yes, there are hundreds of thousands of North Koreans living in China; they are refugees who left to avoid starvation, persecution, or both, and they did not go with permission. If they returned and were caught, they would go to the “reeducation” (read: concentration) camps, if not killed outright.
And yes, there are many North Korean citizens in Japan – citizens that for the most part have never been to North Korea. Many Koreans were transported to Japan as laborers during the colonial period. After the war many remained. As Japan does not grant them citizenship, they chose between the two Koreas. Read about the Chosen Soren to find out more.
May 4th, 2007 at 5:11 pm
Well, that’s a shocker, that one of the twenty officially formulated Pyongyang-approved DPRK FAQ points might be in factual error. Someone ought to point that out for them. I assume the other nineteen are in perfect order, then.
So DPRK’s algorithmical stance on emigration appears to be: “C requires (A and B). A implies not-B. B implies not-A.” Here C = leaving DPRK, requiring both A = one is politically ok and B = one applies for emigration. But A implies not-B, and B implies not-A. It follows that C can never occur. QED.