Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe recently articulated their policy of resolving the issued of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea before proceeding with diplomatic normalization talks. North Korea responded rather predictably:

“What is most essential for settling the issues related to the DPRK-Japan relations is not the ‘abduction issue’ but the issue of Japan’s liquidation of its past crimes… The present hostile relations between the DPRK and Japan originated from Japan’s crime-woven past and these bilateral relations have not yet improved chiefly because Japan has not redressed its crimes…”

The ‘past crimes’ referred to are of course those related to the 1910-1945 occupation and colonization of the Korean Peninsula by Imperial Japan, and preceding events. The Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty of 1965 restored diplomatic ties between South Korea and Japan, and the ROK government received combination of grants and low-interest loans to the tune of $800 million as reparations. Normalization for North Korea could mean well over $10 billion if an equivalent agreement is concluded.

Meanwhile, North Korea continues to backslide on the September 2005 agreement it signed at Six-Party Talks to continue denuclearization negotiations, now stating that an end to U.S. recent economic sanctions is a pre-condition for that:

“The U.S. should, first of all, lift its sanctions against the DPRK, the main factor of scuttling the talks, before talking about the resumption of the talks…”

This neatly sidesteps the rationale for the sanctions:

The United States has clamped down on several North Korean companies it suspects of involvement in counterfeiting, money laundering and the drugs trade, saying the illicit businesses had helped fund Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programmes.

On the surface some might believe that North Korea has some valid points in some areas; while that may be, not in these areas.

Only North Korea (one can hope) knows how many Japanese it has abducted, but it is undoubtedly far more than the 13 the government admits. In 2002 Japan and North Korea were making headway in normalization talks, but any progress quickly unraveled in late 2002, when it became apparent that they North was being less than forthcoming on many, if not most, issues (e.g., secret nuclear programs, faked remains returned to Japan, etc.).

Many of these Japanese are still living in North Korea, one must assume as de facto prisoners, like the vast majority of the North Korean people. It is not unreasonable for Japan to demand satisfaction on this issue before entering into negations that could lead to a massive windfall for the North.

Likewise, North Korea’s illegal counterfeiting of U.S. $100 ‘supernotes,’ which “despite international pressure and laws that characterize such activity as an economic casus belli, or act of war,” is a chronic problem (do a text search for “North Korean diplomats”) that demanded action with evidence late last year:

In the fall, the U.S. unsealed an indictment against the head of an Irish Republican Army splinter group alleging that “quantities of the supernote were manufactured in, and under auspices of the government of, the [DPRK]… North Korea’s government in Pyongyang strenuously denied wrongdoing… David L. Asher, an administration point man on North Korean issues until this summer, said there was overwhelming evidence that Pyongyang had become a brazen “criminal state” reliant on illicit activity, in part to finance its nuclear weapons program. “This is state-sponsored counterfeiting. I don’t know of any other case like this except the Nazis…” (emphasis added)

Considering North Korea’s record with international agreements and law, it should be no surprise that that government is now demanding Japan and the U.S. to ignore its criminal actions. The ball is really in North Korea’s court, and it could easily resolve both matters by a) returning abducted Japanese, and b) ceasing counterfeiting activities. I’m not holding my breath.

(via the NK News Random Insult Generator)