Chinese eminent domain turns violent, part 2
by James Na ~ December 20th, 2005. Filed under: Uncategorized.WaPo has been doing pretty good reporting on the issue of increasing confrontations between rural villagers and the corrupt Chinese rural government bureaucracy.
I blogged about one of its stories previously. Now there is a follow-up. Some choice bits:
Two weeks after a protest that culminated in gunfire and bloodshed, the rebellious farmers and fishermen of Dongzhou have been reduced to submission. Authorities have sealed off the seaside village and flooded its streets and lanes with police patrols, residents said, and an unknown number of men have been summoned by a knock on the door and hauled away for interrogation…After setting up an investigation, police typically pay rewards to those willing to denounce their neighbors. Protesters have described being taken into custody and suffering excruciating pain at the hands of interrogators who try to force them to admit criminal actions during the rioting…
For years, the relentless pursuit of those who challenge the state’s authority has impeded the development of anti-government movements. But loyalty toward the state, particularly among peasants, has diminished in recent years, and repressive tactics have become less effective…
The Public Security Ministry has acknowledged that the number of riots has risen sharply in China, reaching more than 70,000 in 2004 and developing into a major concern for the government. But the violence in Dongzhou stood out because police used their guns. Most of the recent uprisings have been suppressed by riot police armed with tear gas and truncheons. People’s Armed Police, who carry automatic weapons, rarely have been deployed [boldface mine].
Unless there is a major restructuring of the way rural China is administered, I see no chance that this trend will subside. Repressive measures will be effective in the short-term, but will make the rural population more sullen and disloyal (the ChiComs ought to remember why the rural population turned against the Nationalists, then in power, back in the days of the civil war). At this point, I don’t see the Chinese leadership engaging in any substantive changes.
The ChiComs once considered the rural areas their ocean (and themselves as the fish) and kept a close eye on the hearts and minds of villagers. Now, like the Nationalists before them, they have become a corrupt, greedy, elitist urban power. I do not think the folks who are occupied with fine dining and shopping of Beijing or Shanghai really understand how the peasants live and feel in dirt poor rural areas.
They don’t seem to realize that rising living standards in China’s cities are feeding a great deal of expectations in rural areas via mass media — expectations that are clearly not being met due to lopsided economic development and persistent and pervasive government corruption.
As I stated before, I believe the Communist Party has a much more tenuous grip on the country than outwardly appears to be the case. The rural discontent may die down for a while due to concerted, repressive measures, but will simmer and brew until the next spark ignites. When that occurs next time, I predict the violence will be worse.
By themselves, urban dissidents have not been effective in challenging the Party, but I suspect that should they start spreading to the rural areas and provide ideological and intellectual underpinning to such discontent, not to mention organizational acumen, the picture will change drastically. And should that occur, it will be poetic justice to the Communist Party that came to power by precisely the same way.


