More on North Korea’s Rejection of WFP Aid
by Richardson ~ September 30th, 2005. Filed under: Defectors & Refugees, Engagement.This weekend four North Korean ships will arrive in the South to pick up rice. All part of the ongoing process where the North is rejecting food aid from the World Food Program (WFP), in favor of food aid from the South, and probably China.
North Korea’s preference for South Korean and Chinese food aid is so transparent that there should not be a debate about this; South Korea inspected to see where the food went 20 times last year, while the WFP inspects 300-500 times per year (per a WFP official interviewed on NPR Radio, 29 September 2005). Those statistics are the number one clue. The next one is the ‘military first policy.’ North Korea has consistently tried to funnel food aid to the military and the regime elite (e.g., U.S. food aid found in a captured NK sub during the last food crisis). This is not complicated.
It is not about keeping spies out (though of course that must account for some of it), it is about keeping INFORMATION out. Information is the bane of a cult society that has an entire alternate – and completely fictional – history that was created with the express purpose to deify the ‘Great Leader,’ the ‘Dear Leader,’ and now ‘the Commander,’ (if we can trust the report that Jong-chol has been selected and is called by that moniker). The regime sees the starvation as collateral damage, that’s about it.
With all do respect to those who don’t see this; It’s the cult, stupid.
And South Korea is the enabler for this action by North Korea.
Well covered at OneFreeKorea.
UPDATE: From the Asia Times, ‘North Korea plays politics with food aid,’ as pointed out by Slim in some NKZone comments. The article covers much more, but this is an important point:
The United Nations effectively removes politics from food aid by placing itself, an intergovernmental body, between donor and recipient. Donor states cannot place excessive political conditions on humanitarian aid that will effect a change in societal or political status quo. In fact, the only conditions put in place by the United Nations are designed to ensure that the objectives of the specific project can be met. In the case of the current World Food Program (WFP) in North Korea, these conditions aim to ensure aid is distributed to specific targets.


September 30th, 2005 at 5:02 pm
Doesn’t this developement undermine the argument that there is a high chance that North Korea will collapse, especially if the United States adapts a “tougher” diplomatic line and refuses to give any aid to the DPRK? If they are refusing aid from the WFP, it must mean that they do not believe starvation poses a significant threat to their regime.
September 30th, 2005 at 7:23 pm
Well, I don’t see any argument that there is a high chance North Korea will collapse anytime soon. Eventually, perhaps, but those scenarios mostly involve Kim Jong-il dying, resulting in a leadership vacuum. While that (KJI’s death) could happen overnight, it is unlikely to happen soon and we can only hope.
The U.S. diplomatic approach, hard-line or not, will have practically no effect on the WFP issue, since South Korea is enabling North Korea to shun WFP inspections by providing food that is virtually inspection free. The WFP is a UN rather than U.S. entity. Either way the military and regime elite will be fed (aid levels simply increase or decrease the amount of domestically produced food the receive, but not likely the amount), but the WFP provides more food and ensures more of it gets to the people who need it, so it is the people that will suffer, while Kim’s power base will remain unaffected.
Finally, and very unfortunately, you are correct that the regime does not see high loss of population due to starvation as the primary threat, more like some serious collateral damage. Some reports suggest that the regime thought it could still repel (a hypothetical) invasion and recover if at least 30 percent of the population survived the famine. As it was, approximately 90 percent survived.