What a Realistic Six-Party Agreement Might Look Like
by Richardson ~ September 27th, 2005. Filed under: Six-Party Talks. 
Taking into consideration the 19 September agreement, the conflicting U.S.-DPRK positions, the history (PDF) of the issue, particularly lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework, and what can be gleaned from recent news (NK backing down?), a picture is emerging of what an actual agreement might look like (hint: package deal). All hypothetical of course, but what I think a workable deal would look like, and why, if North Korea is actually willing to negotiate in good faith.
The U.S. and DPRK positions are at this point mutually exclusive and seemingly set in stone. The U.S. wants CVID (complete verifiable irreversible disarmament) of nuclear weapons before even discussing a LWR for North Korea and before offering other incentives, while North Korea wants a LWR upfront, before CVID. Aside from North Korea, the other five participants “are all in agreement” that North Korea must give up its nuclear programs first as a basic matter of sequencing. Unless something gives there is not even a starting point in these positions.
But I think something can (not necessarily will) give. Not all agree with the U.S. position that the subject of LWR is off the table, even for discussion, until after CVID. Some former senior South Korean officials are predictably calling for the completion of the two LWR that were started as part of the (currently suspended) KEDO project. I was wondering when the idea of promising to complete those two LWR would come up, as it is the obvious solution to the standoff, as North Korea no doubt intended.
A new angle on this emerged yesterday, when the U.S. said, “it would provide nuclear reactor fuel to countries that refrain from enriching uranium in an effort to prevent the process from being used to make atomic weapons.” This could potentially lead to the U.S. providing uranium for North Korean LWR. The between-the-lines implication is less hesitation to act if a receiving nation tried to get around IAEA safeguards — ‘we gave it to you, we have the right to destroy it by whatever means if you refuse to comply with safeguards.’ It would be somewhat easier to justify an attack in that situation that in the current one.
It is also not realistic to believe that North Korea would achieve CVID before anything else is discussed – it would be fair and just considering past offenses, but it’s just not going to happen. Again the obvious solution is a package deal, somewhat like the 1994 Agreed Framework, but with some key differences. Ambiguous language, especially in reference to time, sequence, and inspections, would have to be completely removed or clarified in both English and Korean.
With this in mind, an agreement might include these key elements:
Phase One - Simultaneous diplomatic recognition, with other aspects of normalization on a specific timetable, including the end of sanctions and the establishment of offices in both capitals. This would probably include further non-aggression statements from the U.S. and a formal peace treaty.
Phase Two – To begin after Phase One successfully completed. CVID in substance, perhaps phrased as, “the dismantlement of all nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to effective verification” (language per Tong Kim), also with clear timelines. In effect, a major and unhindered inspection regime.
Phase Three - The completion of the KEDO LWR, after CVID as defined above, with clear timelines as to how long after CVID was verified that construction would begin and be completed. Electric energy assistance from South Korea in the interim.
Such a sequence would make it clear that the phases would have to be completed in order for North Korea to get the LWR it wants – but they would get the LWR if they follow the agreement. Delay at any point would not necessarily have to break the deal, but delay implementation of the next phase. Phase one would be mostly a red tape exercise over weeks or months, but not years. The second item could begin as soon as the first finished, but likely would be on the order of at least months, probably years. LWR as that last phase would of course be the incentive for North Korea not to delay CVID.
September 27th, 2005 at 8:15 pm
I just don’t see President Bush signing a peace treaty with the North Koreans. In his heart, he knows they are evil, and he won’t bring his administration down to that level. Just my 2 cents.
September 27th, 2005 at 9:00 pm
Yes, I know what you mean, the NK leadership is indeed evil. But that’s part of politics - making compromises.
I also think that an agreement would be viewed by Bush as the lesser of two evils, the other evil being nukes loose in the world.
On the other hand, Bush might not even be in office when/if it ever comes to a deal… and you read the ‘disclaimer.’ I’m not holding my breath for a deal.
September 29th, 2005 at 5:29 am
I respect your fortitude in undertaking the analysis, but, finally, I think your punchline - the reference to your omnibus disclaimer — is all that matters.
In their usual stuck on stupid mode of being fair to all sides by assuming their moral equivalence, and ignoring inconvenient contrary factual evidence, the media generally have held the NORKS and the US (why not also Japan and the ROKS) equally culpable for the unravelling of the ‘94 Accords.
What the record demonstrates, however, is a pattern of deliberate, tenacious and persistent efforts by the NORKS to (re)negotiate each and every detail of the implementation of the Accords so as to get more than what was originally agreed and thereby effectively delaying its impementation and keeping the entire substance of the agreement in play.
To anyone who has spent any time negotiating ordinary, not to mention extraordinary, business transaction in the ROK, this should not be terribly surprising.
To anyone with such experience, and with the corresponding knowledge that their ROK counterparts in mere business transactions in an ostensibly law-abiding society will never effectively CONCLUDE matters until they are in a tactical and strategic straitjacket - and even then may seek to weasel around if you have been stupid enough to agree to the choice of Korean law and/or, even more disastrously, recourse to the Korean courts or arbitration tribunals for dispute resolution — the idea that the NORKS are going voluntarily to negotiate away in any kind of agreement what they themselves have identified as the sword and shield of their soveregnity and national dignity is positively Panglossian.
September 29th, 2005 at 10:47 am
I guess I go to the trouble for a couple of reasons. Someday the leadership will change, and someday an agreement will have to be concluded, with whoever is in charge. And KJI could make an agreement never intended to be kept, and then die (or whatever), leaving a new regime that might implement.
So, I think the goal should still be to get a deal, with the Six-Parties, and hold them to it as best as possible until the regime does change. The ‘deal’ could be years off, and KJI leaving the picture a few years after that, but it will eventually happen. That will be the chance to clean the nukes out of the North. Or for someone there to make a tidy fortune selling them on the terrorist black market, we’ll have to wait and see.
Yes, the moral equivalence thing bothers me as well. It’s absurd at best.
And I’m well aware of the record and negotiating patterns. Here is a link to some of it;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/documents/dprk002.html#1994
In ’94 it was the DPRK that drove/controlled where negotiations went, for the most part. I think Hill will do better than Carter.
I also think that the North may have overstated how they really feel about nukes being so critical to security. Yes, they are important as they are cheaper to maintain (once in place) than a standing army of a million, but not really needed. The guns on the DMZ have been/are more than a sufficient deterrent, and is in my opinion the reason we (U.S.) considers the cost unacceptable. This was the case long before Iraq. At any rate, making nukes seem move important to the regime than they actually are is a bargaining device.
But for now it’s all academic.
November 22nd, 2005 at 9:43 pm
“I just don’t see President Bush signing a peace treaty with the North Koreans. In his heart, he knows they are evil, and he won’t bring his administration down to that level. Just my 2 cents.
By James C. on 27 September 2005 8:15 PM
Gee. I wonder how the Bush administration is viewed by some countries. Do you suppose the word “EVIL” is ever used?