HELL FREEZES OVER, PART TWO; PROS, CONS, & ETCETERA
by Richardson ~ September 19th, 2005. Filed under: Six-Party Talks.Here are some of the major issues addressed – minus the fluff – although the agreement is very tentative at this point. Starting with the relatively innocuous issues, which are paraphrased from the text of the accord and not in order appearance in that text;
The U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Russia will provide energy assistance to North Korea. [COMMENT: No-brainer – that’s the major portion of the compensation for giving up nuclear programs and weapons.]
The U.S. offers security guarantees not to attack or invade with either conventional or nuclear weapons or forces. [COMMENT: A giveaway since the U.S. would not attack NK anyway. The U.S. announced the withdrawal of nuclear weapons worldwide in September 1991.]
South Korea will continue to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons or related programs. [COMMENT: Also a giveaway; the South has too much to lose internationally by breaking NPT agreements, besides U.S. military-political support.]
The 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented. [COMMENT: Any new agreement should include this. Important to note that this agreement explicitly mentions Uranium, while the 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF) mentioned it only implicitly by mention of the 1992 agreement.]
Japan and North Korea will move towards normalizing relations, including reparations. [COMMENT: Huge bonus for NK, which was very close to normalization in 2002, before Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, and new information about abducted Japanese shattered any chances for a Japan-NK deal. North Korea could be looking at well over US$10 billion in reparations and loans (PDF) if an agreement is reached.]
And moving on to the cons or stumbling block to reaching an actual operation agreement;
North Korea will ‘abandon’ all a) nuclear weapons and b) all nuclear weapons programs, will renter the c) nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), and d) re-implement IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards. [COMMENT: So far North Korea denies having a Uranium-based program, although Pakistan has independently confirmed this. The word ‘verifiable’ is in the text, but it does not yet mention CVID.]
North Korea claims the right to ‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy.’ [COMMENT: NK currently uses graphite-moderated reactors, which produce a relatively large amount of nuclear waste suitable to be reprocessed into weapons-grade Plutonium. This could be a major problem if/when NK decides to exit the NPT and throw out inspectors again.]
The issue of the provision of light-water reactors (LWR) to North Korea is not resolved either way and is to be discussed at some point in the future. [COMMENT: This is the major stumbling block – not resolved, just put off to cause headaches at a later date. Perhaps this is a face-saving measure for NK, but it likely will haunt those who want the overall issue resolved.]
So in the end, two major cons remain; CVID and LWR.
As an afterthought, I think I should make it very, very clear that there is a long way to go before any actual action occurs in North Korea, and that will be a later deal. South Korean President Roh is wildly exaggerating when he states this accord is ‘epoch-making’ (he should just step down already). Also, it was not the efforts of the ‘two Koreas’ that caused this to happen; North Korea has been fighting this the whole way, and China deserves more credit than the South. I hope that South Koreans do not become giddy with false hope, as the majority did after the June 2000 North-South summit. And this is not about the ‘Sunshine Policy,’ which I liken to a dead horse; it was great at first, but it died some time ago and South Korea is still trying to ride the bloated corpse.
This from the Asia Times sums things up well:
Lee Dong-bok, Seoul-based senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told Reuters that, “The agreement allows participants in the talks to interpret it as they like, yet no issue has been resolved. The discussion on the light-water reactor issue has been simply delayed and we don’t know when that will be. The issue may emerge again when they begin discussing details.”



September 27th, 2005 at 4:30 pm
HELL FREEZES OVER, PART TWO; PROS, CONS, & ETCETERA
HELL FREEZES OVER, PART TWO; PROS, CONS, & ETCETERA
[…] Taking into consideration the 19 September agreement, the conflicting U.S.-DPRK positions, the history (PDF) of the issue, particularly lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework, and what can be gleaned from recent news, a picture is emerging of what an actual agreement might look like (hint: package deal). This is all hypothetical of course, but is what I think a workable deal would look like, and why, if North Korea is actually willing to negotiate in good faith. […]
January 4th, 2006 at 2:44 pm
HELL FREEZES OVER, PART TWO; PROS, CONS, & ETCETERA
HELL FREEZES OVER, PART TWO; PROS, CONS, & ETCETERA
[…] The North didn’t just land the ‘first blow,’ it attempted to unilaterally alter the implied timeline of the agreement. The text of the agreement here, comments on the agreement in general here, and on the North’s reneging here. On the other hand, the U.S. sanctions were in response to new evidence of massive North Korean counterfeiting U.S. currently – which could be considered an act of war. Two separate issues. If North Korea can keep economic and security issues separate with the South, it’s hypocritical of them to insist otherwise in this case. North Korea struck back by boycotting the next round of the nuclear talks and complaining that its concessions on nuclear weapons had been poorly rewarded. Then Washington matched that show of childish petulance by getting back into the name-calling game, with the new American ambassador to South Korea labeling the North a “criminal regime.” That may be accurate, but it is not the sort of thing diplomats say publicly when their countries are engaged in delicate diplomacy. […]