I’ve been very busy with work, family, and reserves the past few weeks. The pace is not expected to let up any time soon, but as there are lulls I’ll post updates.

Several factors – all driven by Pyongyang – are at work and have created an increasingly tense military situation on the peninsula. Additional long-range missile tests are expected, and naval clashes along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) are becoming more likely.

Political

Some background: In January 2009, North Korea “voided” all political-military agreements with South Korea, although this did not seem to include the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War, or economic agreements like the Kaesong Industrial Park or the Keumgangsan tours.

• On 27 May, Pyongyang announced it the Korean People’s Army (KPA), “will not be bound to the Armistice Agreement any longer,” due to South Korea’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), although legally speaking, that does not negate the boundaries.
• On 04 June, North Korea will try U.S. journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee on charges of spying. The two reporters were arrested on the Chinese side of the North Korea-Chinese border on 17 March after briefing crossing into North Korea to conduct interviews. Some analysts believe the two, acting as pawns in the current struggle between North Korea and the U.S., will receive long sentences in labor camps.

Missiles

Bottom line: North Korea appears to be preparing for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, and I expect it to do so in the coming weeks.

• On 05 April, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) (대포동 2호) missile, most likely in a space launch vehicle (SLV) configuration.
• The UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned the launch on 13 April, and North Korea withdrew form disarmament talks the following day, declaring it would resort its partially disabled nuclear facilities.
• North Korea also demanded an immediate apology from the UNSC on 29 April, threatening both, “nuclear tests and test-firings of intercontinental ballistic missiles,” if one was not received. Note both references are plural.
• On 01 June, U.S. SecDef Gates stated North Korea, “may be preparing to launch another long-range missile.” South Korean intelligence sources have leaked that such a missile has been transported to a North Korean launch facility, Dongchang-ri, on the west cost via train (the April launch was from Musudan-ri on the east coast, so this is an entirely different launch facility).

West Coast Military Developments

Bottom line: Ongoing KPA preparations indication North Korea is bracing for possible military confrontations on the west coast, perhaps along the Northern Limit Line (NLL). North Korea recently declared the 1953 armistice voice, but has never recognized the NLL as a legal sea border.

• Military units on North Korea’s west coast are increasing ammunition reserves to twice the normal levels and there has been an increase in vehicle movement in the region.
• North Korea has also declared a large are of the Yellow Sea (West Sea) off limits until July. While closure areas for military exercises and live fire events are not uncommon, the length of time for this closure is anomalous.
• The Korean People’s Army (KPA) has also significantly reduced communications, effectively increasing security.
• The number of illegal Chinese fishing vessels near the NLL has significantly declined recently.

That someone in the administration recognizes the absurdity of engaging in Ground Hog Day deals with North Korea (and is publicly commenting about it) is somewhat encouraging. Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, recently had this to say about North Korea:

“We will not stand idly by as North Korea builds the capability to wreak destruction on any target in Asia — or on us,” Gates said, according to the Associated Press. He did not call North Korea’s nuclear program a direct threat to the United States but said it was a “harbinger of a dark future.”
[. . .]
“They create a crisis, and the rest of us pay the price to return to the status quo ante,” he said. “As the expression goes in the U.S., I’m tired of buying the same horse twice.”

“There are other ways perhaps to get the North Koreans to change their approach,” Gates said. “I think this notion that we buy our way back to the status quo ante is an approach that I personally at least think we ought to think very hard about.” (emphasis added)

For more on this and North Korea’s threat of nuclear war, see OneFreeKorea.

ROK Drop: US Says It Can Intercept North Korean Missile
NK Econ Watch: North Korea’s social change, and; DPRK not about to collapse
DPRK Forum: Countdown to the Showtrial in the DPRK
EagleSpeak: North Korea Threatens
War is Boring: Kyle’s Far East Roundup 5/29/09 [see leadership chart]
Notions Capital: North Korea - Alternative Theory
Ogle Earth: North Korea’s 2009 nuclear test: A geospatial roundup

Curtis Melvin, of the North Korean Economy Watch blog and North Korea Uncovered (Google Earth), recently did an interview on the Rachel Maddow show on MSNBC, and is featured in a Times Online article, both focusing on his mapping of North Korea. If you use Google Earth and have an interest in North Korea, his North Korea Uncovered is a must.

The importance of the three short-range missiles launched by North Korea on Monday and the two follow-on launches Tuesday is being overstated in the press and by some politicians; this week is not about short-range missiles but about an apparently functional nuclear device design.

North Korea generally conducts several short-range ground-to-ship or ship-to-ship missile flight tests in either the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan (East Sea) every year. These tests can serve any combination of three purposes; (1) live fire training for the military, (2) research and development, and, at times, (3) to get attention with minor demonstrations of power during periods of regional tension.

Such launches should not get the attention they do unless they occur in the vicinity of opposing forces (e.g., along the NLL) or are part of actual attacks. Some of the missiles fired are said to be based on China’s Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which it in turn based on Russian Styx. While these are dangerous under the right conditions, we’re talking about 1960s technology and a range of ~100 miles.

Unfortunately every minor launch carried out by North Korea is amplified beyond all reason. These launches aren’t genuine provocations unless one is looking to be provoked.

The title assumes North Korea did test a nuclear device, which I think likely, and not an equivalent amount of TNT, initially thought a possibility in 2006 until radioactive isotopes of krypton and xenon were detected.

There are several reasons for a North Korea to conduct a nuclear test and it’s difficult if not impossible to rank them by importance as Kim Jong-il might. The lines also blur for some stated here, and no doubt some could be broken down further.

Proof of concept: Perhaps the simplest reason, and in light of the failure of the 2006 nuclear test – to prove to themselves (regime elite) and the rest of the world they in fact do have a no kidding nuclear weapons capability. Since this is something North Korea intends to keep, it’s important to know the design functions as intended. Look for another Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2) to prove a delivery capability.

Domestic audiences: Two sides to this one; the population as a whole, the regime elite. Whatever the outcome of the test, all would be told it was a spectacular success that boosted the prestige and security of the regime, etc. But elites would find out sooner in and greater detail of any failure. In the case of elites, especially the military, a success gives them a bit of confidence in being able to maintain the status quo and their positions of power.

Succession – North Korea after the Dear Leader: There have been several adjustments to North Korea’s political system since Kim Jong-il’s stroke last August, for example changes to the National Defense Commission and many other changes of personnel in regime leadership. These changes appear to be geared towards leaving whomever succeeds Kim Jong-il (my pick is still Kim Jong-un) in a better position, both domestically and when it comes to dealing with outside powers. For more see, “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 1),” and “What if Kim Jong-il Died… Today? (Part 2).”

Setting the stage for negotiations: Whenever returns to the negotiating table, be it Six-Party Talks or some other forum, they want to there as a nuclear power. Perhaps with Kim Jong-il heading the regime, or his successor (assuming the regime survives Kim’s death). The first test was a failure and Washington could easily ignore that status for Pyongyang, but with a likely successful test North Korea is moving towards de facto nuclear power status. Just getting the U.S. to admit North Korea is a nuclear state would be seen as a wild victory in Pyongyang, and would also feed domestic propaganda.

Wheeling and dealing, someday: Not right away, but eventually (the test was not about near-term concessions). At some point someone in Washington may make North Korea another offer they can’t refuse (to renege on) in exchange for selling off or allowing the monitoring of some part of their nuclear program. But North Korea won’t give up its nuclear program as long as it a sovereign country.

No good reason not to: The U.S. and UN have demonstrated to North Korea that neither has the current capacity or willpower to respond in a way North Korea finds unacceptable. The 2006 missile and nuke tests, the April TD-2 test, and now this; the U.S. talked big but in reality there are no consequences for North Korea, and Kim Jong-il knows it. What could/should be done? See OFK’s “Plan B” (no, it’s not a pill).

What it’s not about: Finally, Pyongyang did not conduct this second nuclear test because it felt ignored or wanted more attention from the Obama administration. It’s a reason that gets attached to many North Korean actions as sometimes North Korean acts of brinkmanship are indeed meant to get America’s attention, but not this time I think. After the April TD-2 test, North Korea threatened to escalate – what we’re seeing now – if the UN even discussed the TD-2 issue. A ridiculous and absurd demand, since the UN Security Council was practically guaranteed to make some sort of watered down statement. North Korea likely had a nuclear test planned before April and only the most unrealistic of responses from the U.S. would have prevented it.

Probably I missed something obvious, but those are the main reasons as I see them.

Not sure if this effect was intentional or not, but there seems to be markedly less interest in this likely successful nuclear test than there was for the unsuccessful one in 2006. Perhaps this is due to it following the TD-2 test so closely and getting sort of numbed to North Korean antics – how many times can we go to the brink of brinkmanship? – but I detect a “so what” factor. There is indeed a reason to care about this, but that’s the topic for another post…

Update, North Korea’s announcement: Full text of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announcement of the nuclear test, presumably a TV broadcast (via the Independent):

“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians.

“The current nuclear test was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control and the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems arising in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.

“The successful nuclear test is greatly inspiring the army and people of the DPRK all out in the 150-day campaign, intensifying the drive for effecting a new revolutionary surge to open the gate to a thriving nation.

“The test will contribute to defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region around it with the might of (the military first policy) Songun.”

Also see a slightly different translation at the Daily NK, and the online KCNA announcement from 2006.

A major difference between 2006 and now is the tone. In 2006 “scientific research,” “scientific consideration,” and “a great and prosperous nation” were all stressed before mention of a, “self-reliant defence capability.” In 2009 “nuclear deterrent” was stressed before science and “thriving nation” speak.

Original post: North Korea has announced it conducted a second underground nuclear test. The alleged nuclear test occurred at 09:54 local time, 25 May (00:54Z 25 May, 20:54 EDT, 24 May) at site the first nuclear test was conducted in October 2006.

Currently the only indication of the test is Pyongyang’s claim and a seismic event at the location of the 2006 test. The U.S. Geological Survey reported a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance at the site. In 2006 there was a 3.58 magnitude seismic tremor. The larger magnitude seismic measurement does not necessarily equate to a vastly more powerful device being tested since the size of the underground test chamber and other factors can effect seismic readings, though it does tend to suggest North Korea did get things right this time.

South Korean and Russian officials said the explosion was up to 20 kilotons, while the U.S. bis still analyzing the data. The 2006 test was less than one kiloton.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons likely are plutonium based, though it’s possible there is or was a secret uranium enrichment program. For more on North Korea’s nuclear programs, see this.

There will be an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council today. I’m sure they’ll be very, very angry and will write Kim Jong-il a letter telling him how angry they are.

Hillary Clinton, speaking at a graduation ceremony at Barnard College in New York City, displayed an amazing degree of naiveté:

“We have two young women journalists right now imprisoned in North Korea and you can get busy on the Internet and let the North Koreans know that we find that absolutely unacceptable,” Clinton told the graduation ceremony.

Probably the U.S. Secretary of State shouldn’t publicly entertain such ridiculous notions; the North Korean people don’t have access to the internet, and a regime that doesn’t give a damn about starving ten percent of the population doesn’t care about Facebook or Twitter.

North Korea announced last week it would try two American journalists who strayed into the country but were on the Chinese side of the border when apprehended – Euna Lee and Laura Ling – on unspecified charges.

Update: I should have noted in the original post that awareness of what’s happening in North Korea is important, particularity in electing officials who have a clue.

North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) missile - probably a space launch vehicle (SLV) - on 05 April 2009. This was a launch of many firsts for Pyongyang, including releasing data about the launch beforehand and some actual video of the event afterwards:

Like the 1998 Taepo Dong 1 (TD-1) launch that failed, this TD-2 launch did not complete the stated goal; placing an experimental communications satellite into orbit. North Korea still insists this one placed a satellite - the Kwangmyongsong-2 (광명성 2호) - into space. However, as some have noted, the payload could have been a bag of sand for all we know.

The bottom line is that the test technically was a failure, but for many reasons it was still useful to North Korea. First and foremost, they gained test data for the very same platform that could be used as an ICBM (the only difference between an SLV and an ICBM is the payload; satellite or warhead). Pyongyang will use it for internal propaganda, since the audience won’t have access to the truth about the failure to place the satellite into orbit. Missiles, long off the bargaining table, are back and have distracted the nascent U.S. administration from the nuclear issue. Not that any talks, be the multi- or bi-lateral, will ever solve the nuclear issue. And once again North Korea has demonstrated the complete uselessness of the UN in such matters. ROK Drop lists a few more reasons.

I’ll go out on a limb and suggest that North Korea will follow-up with a nuclear test and try to establish de facto nuclear power status, with and ICBM delivery capability as the cherry on top. When? I’ll guess later in 2009, but it could depend how much money-for-nothing they can get first. At any rate, the goal likely is to come to the negotiating table at some point in the future as a nuclear power rather than the nuclear wannabe power. It’s still my opinion that North Korea under Kim Jong-il will never bargain it’s nuclear material away, and that engaging them with the hope of genuine progress in that area is foolish.

Also see this excellent animation of the TD-2 launch: