North Korea has turned over thousands of pages of documentation for its plutonium-based nuclear program:

North Korea handed over more than 18,000 pages of nuclear weapons documents to a U.S. diplomat visiting Pyongyang on Thursday that will help verify its plutonium holdings, senior U.S. officials said.

[…]

“We will see if these documents will play a role in that process, but again it is going to be a verification process that plays out over a period of time,” [McCormak] said. “Our top three priorities are going to be verification, verification and verification,” he added.

[…]

A sticking point has been Pyongyang’s reluctance to discuss any transfer of nuclear technology to other countries, notably Syria, as well as its suspected pursuit of uranium enrichment.

It’s important to note that documents without physical access to all related facilities does not equal verification; unfettered access is needed.

As the article notes, there are two gaping knowledge gaps; the uranium program and nuclear proliferation to Syria. The U.S. should not accept any declaration that does not thoroughly address those two issues. Luckily for the American people, some in congress are at least raising awareness of the real possibility of the Bush administration doing worse than the Clinton legacy.

A few times I have come across the assertion that the 1994 Agreed Framework did not prohibit North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, and that document did not even include the word “uranium,” as an argument for why the U.S. was responsible for the disintegration of the Agreed Framework. However, that is a myth and such arguments are entirely specious; any sort of uranium enrichment program absolutely was prohibited under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The 1994 Agreed Framework (PDF) Article III, section 2 states:

The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (emphasis added)

So, the 1994 Agreed Framework references another agreement. The 1992 Joint Declaration (DOC) states in Article 3:

The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. (emphasis added)

Although it is not explicitly stated in the 1994 Agreed Framework, through referencing the 1992 Joint Declaration, uranium enrichment facilities – and therefore uranium enrichment – are implicitly prohibited by the 1994 Agreed Framework.

An example would be if one signed a contract and agreed to abide by certain regulations. Those regulations are not spelled out explicitly in the contract, but are implicitly included through the reference. Violation of those regulations would put one in violation of the contract, even if those regulations were not specifically spelled out in the contract.

I’m not sure, after reading these agreements, how someone could attempt to say a uranium enrichment program wasn’t forbidden by the 1994 Agreed Framework. But some still do, amazingly.

KQCD-TV: North Dakota Korean War Vet Laid To Rest
Dong-a Ilbo: Nuclear Warheads Likely to Be Left Out of N. Korea’s Report
AP: US State Department official to visit North Korea for nuclear talks
AP: SK to give financial assistance to victims of abduction by NK for first time
Asia Times: North Korea stoic in the face of famine (Andrei Lankov)
Asia Times: Back to the hard line on North Korea (Don Kirk)
WT: Lots of talk about NK, but action plan from Israel (Don Kirk)
Times: Kim Jong-il builds ‘Thunderbirds’ runway for war in North Korea
Dong-a Ilbo: Ten N. Koreans Might Have Died in Syria Bombing
Daily NK: A Review of the Yoduk Story Musical, by a Defector
AP: North Korea rejects liaison office proposal from South Korea
Christian Post: N. Korea Freedom Week Kicks Off with Worldwide Protests
FEER: From Pyongyang With Love
FEER: North Korea’s Nukes: Is the Party Over?
Interfax: Japan asks Russia to press N. Korea over abductions
AP: North Korean capital gives Olympic torch warm welcome [video]
AP: [North] Korean tries to set himself on fire during Seoul torch run

Rather than belligerent insults using archaic English following the Bush administration’s presentation of rather convincing evidence that North Korea was proliferating nuclear technology to Syria, North Korea is offering something to “complement” the declaration of nuclear programs called for in the 13 February 2007 deal:

North Korea has tentatively agreed to give the United States thousands of records from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor dating back to 1990 to complement an expected declaration of its nuclear programs, administration and congressional officials said yesterday.

That is very nice, but I am more concerned with what North Korea is still not offering up; 1) what’s actually called for in the deal - a full and complete nuclear declaration; 2) unfettered access (including material samples) to all known and suspected nuclear facilities; 3) information and materials to ascertain the true status of North Korea’s uranium program, including the equipment known to have been sent from Pakistan, and the fate of some thousands of aluminum tubes purchased by North Korea.

Without those items, this offer of records is just a bait and switch.

Better late than never:

The Unification Ministry has adjusted the content of unification education for both adults and students with President Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy, emphasizing the importance of national security and North Korea’s human rights issues.

Some left-leaning lecturers, who have been slammed for propagating distorted views on North Korea for the past decade, are going to be replaced and textbooks describing North Korea’s history in a positive tone revised.

[…]

The Education Center for Unification under the Unification Ministry has reinforced the content of unification education, aiming at instilling in adults the importance of national security focusing on North Korea’s nuclear issue and the relation between South Korea and the United States and informing them of North Korea’s human rights abuses, according to some participants of the meeting.

During a meeting in P’yŏngyang on 04 October 2002, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Seok-Ju admitted to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea had a uranium enrichment program. That was the public beginning of the end of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Now the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has revealed that North Korea was assisting Syria in a program to obtain Plutonium at the Al-Kibar facilty. Even though any assistance for any nuclear-related project is another clear violation of UNSCR 1718, the Bush administration is unlikely to halt agreements related to the Six-Party Talks as it is in full Legacy Mode.

The following is a clip of CIA video (11 min 38 sec) presented to congress on Friday (via Arms Control Wonk):

A nuclear power plant is not a nuclear weapons program. However, several details indicate the Syrian plant was in fact meant for a plutonium based nuclear weapons program:

• The reactor design was nearly identical to the antiquated graphite-moderated reactor located at Yongbyon in North Korea, and North Korean scientists and technicians were known to have been involved in the Syrian project. As the video states, only North Korea has constructed this type of reactor in the past 35 years.
• The reactor would have produced Plutonium 239 (Pu-239), which is used in the production of implosion nuclear weapons (e.g. the “Fat Man” atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki, 09 August 1945).
• The reactor was not configured to deliver electric to the Syrian electrical grid.
• The reactor was built in secret, in violation of agreements with the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
• Note that no Plutonium reprocessing facilities were yet constructed. This is not surprising since the reactor was not yet producing Plutonium to reprocess.

David Albright, of Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has downplayed IC claims that the facility in Al-Kibar was related to a nuclear weapons program because, “The United States and Israel have not identified any Syrian plutonium separation facilities or nuclear weaponization facilities.” This, despite the secrecy of the program (and in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty), the fact that the reactor was not configured for electricity production or deliver to the Syrian electric grid, and the fact that reprocessing and weaponization would come only after the plant was successful. Once again Albright plays apologist to a regime bent on obtaining nuclear weapons.

Syria was foolish for thinking it could hide such a facility under the gaze of Israel. North Korea was foolish for thinking it could conceal its involvement in nuclear proliferating. But perhaps both will have the last laugh as the Bush administration is so focused on obtaining a pseudo denuclearization agreement from North Korea that it will let this slide. If so, this Bush administration will have done much more damage to our security than even the Clinton administrations ignoring the problem in the late 1990s.

See related posts at OneFreeKorea and ROK Drop.

A joint statement (DOC) was issued at the conclusion of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks in September, 2005 that “reaffirmed that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” It was hailed, by most, as a great breakthrough in coaxing North Korea to sell give up its nuclear program(s). About ten days before that statement, a hint of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) scandal was in the news, and in December 2005 the U.S. began blocking transactions of the Macau-based BDA.

While I thought it was the right thing to do (and believe we should never have lifted the related sanctions on North Korean banking), from a policy coordination standpoint, it seemed that the left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing when it came to U.S. policy on North Korea.

Now there seems to be similar lack of coordination, or perhaps a behind-the-scenes struggle between the Department of State and the Intelligence Community over what North Korea policy ought to be.

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Sorry I missed the anniversary, but better late than never: yesterday was the 48th anniversary of the 4.19 Revolution of 1960, which brought down Syngman Rhee (이승만) government.

The background to this “revolution” is complex, but it can be simply summarized as the final act of revulsion toward the increasingly autocratic rule of Syngman Rhee’s government. As there was still great admiration for President Rhee, the founder of ROK, much of the ire was directed at his vice president Lee Ki-Boong (이기붕). Lee received nearly 100% of the vote in the fatally flawed election of March 15th earlier that year and was widely disliked for incompetence and corruption.

He was, however, very loyal to President Rhee (Rhee adopted one of Lee’s sons) and was retained by Rhee despite the great unpopularity.

Since the March election, there was much unrest. On April 18th, a group of Korea University (yes, alma mater of the current ROK President Lee Myung-Bak) students demonstrated against the government and was ambushed by gangsters (likely backed by some in the authorities) on their way back home. Dozens were hurt. This outraged the public and even bigger protests mounted the following day, including those by high school students.

And this, on April 19th, is where it all came to a boil. To suppress the demonstrators Lee Ki-Boong authorized the police to fire upon the protestors. Dozens of young students were killed and hundreds were wounded. When journalists questioned the wisdom of this move, Lee brazenly responded “Afterall, we gave guns to the police so they can shoot.”

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I like all of it (courtesy of WaPo):

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said today that he will propose setting up a high-level diplomatic channel between North Korea and South Korea, including creating the first liaison offices in the two nations’ capitals. [Snip]

Lee has said that the relationship between the two countries must take a back seat to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, a significant shift from the more conciliatory policy of his predecessor [Boldface mine.] [Snip]

“Both North and South Korea must change their ways,” Lee said. “It is not sufficient for North Korea to resort to their old ways.”

To that end, he said, he wanted to establish a permanent channel so the two countries could have a regular dialogue, rather than intermittent contacts elicited by crises. He said that offices should be headed by officials with direct access to the leaders of each country.

“Between the two Koreas we need to always have dialogue going on,” Lee said. “In the past, we had dialogue between the two Koreas whenever there was a need, and when there wasn’t a need, the dialogue would close. I don’t think that is helpful.”

Yes, by all means, talk to them, but be tough — and it looks like President Lee has been and will continue to be so. His policy, so far, shows all the signs of a real engagement (per Richardson earlier).

Update: Dr. Petrov notes in comments, per input from Ruediger Frank on the Korean Studies Mailing List, that there are at least two other common forms of address for Kim Jong-il, which have been added as the last two rows of the table below.

Original post: Today while (finally) reading Andrei Lankov’s, “North of the DMZ” (pg 30), I was reminded that I had not corrected a previous DPRK Studies post; in Korean, Kim Jong-il is technically now referred to as the “Great Leader,” rather than the “Dear Leader” used in English:

In English, Kim Jong-il is still referred to as the “Dear Leader” and his father as the “Great Leader,” though two different Korean words are used for “leader” and the same Korean word (Widaehan, “great”) precedes what is translated as “leader,” and is translated as “great” or “dear” for the sake of differentiation.

Kim Jong-il will not take the title Suryŏngnim (leader, chieftain), which, like the position of President of the DPRK, is reserved for his father.